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Abstract
The studies in this report analyze the effects of decoupled payments in the
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act on recipient house-
holds, and assess land, labor, risk management, and capital market conditions that
can lead to links between decoupled payments and production choices.  Each
study contributes a different perspective to understanding the response of U.S.
farm households and production to decoupled income transfers.  Some use new
microdata on farm households collected through USDA’s Agricultural Resource
Management Survey (ARMS), initiated in 1996, and its predecessor survey.
These data are used to compare household and producer behavior and outcomes
before and after the FAIR Act.  Other studies use applied or conceptual models to
characterize the impact of introducing decoupled payments.  Collectively, the
chapters represent an early stage in the empirical analysis of decoupled payments.
The studies address many aspects of the payments’ household impacts but
remaining issues call for additional analysis.  As the analytical paradigm changes
with the evolution of farm programs, the development of appropriate data and
models will improve our understanding of farm program impacts on the behavior
and well-being of U.S. farm households, and the agricultural sector.
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Introduction
Mary E. Burfisher and Jeffrey Hopkins
For decades, economists have proposed decoupling farm subsidies from
production choices in order to support agricultural producers without
distorting commodity markets and trade. Decoupled payments provide
income transfers of a fixed amount to producers while allowing them to
make market-based decisions about which commodities to produce.  The
program design of decoupled payments breaks the link between a producer’s
actions and eligibility for or level of payment.  In contrast, “coupled” farm
support, which is based on current prices and production of specific crops,
distorts production incentives.  This can lead to overproduction, lower
market prices, higher program costs, and an inefficient allocation of national
resources, often with spillover effects on world markets. 
In the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, the
United States revamped its farm subsidies with the introduction of a decou-
pled payment program.  “Production Flexibility Contracts” (PFC) provided
annual lump-sum cash payments to farm operators based on their historical
program crop production.1 PFCs were fixed payments announced in
advance for the duration of the FAIR Act (1996-2002) and transferred a
total of $36 billion to eligible producers, with an average payment per
eligible household in 2001 of about $9,000.  The FAIR Act also provided
greater flexibility in planting decisions and terminated acreage reduction
programs.  Decoupled farm payments—now called “direct payments” under
the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act—amount to about
$5 billion annually.  
Has the introduction of decoupled farm payments in the FAIR Act helped
improve the well-being of farm households—defined broadly to include
their income, wealth, and their work choices?  Have they increased the
market orientation of U.S. agriculture, or do they distort production and
trade as do coupled farm programs?  The challenge in studying decoupled
payments is that it calls for a broader analytical paradigm than that used for
more traditional U.S. farm programs.  For coupled programs, the main
impacts can be observed in commodity markets. By changing the returns to
production of specific commodities or to input uses, coupled payments
create incentives that directly influence production decisions.  Producer
response to coupled programs can be mostly captured in a commodity or
farm enterprise framework that focuses on these relative price changes. The
main impact of decoupled payments, in contrast, is their effect on the
income and wealth of recipient households.  To assess the possible impacts
of decoupled payments on U.S. agriculture, we need to know about recipient
households’ spending, saving, and working decisions—in agricultural and
nonagricultural activities—and how these decisions may have changed with
increased income and wealth.  In addition, we can consider indirect links
between decoupled payments and production choices that may exist due to
risk preferences and market conditions. 
1 For more information on farm and
commodity programs covered by the
1996 farm act as amended, see
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/
FarmPolicy/19962001commodity.htm.
For information on farm policy terms,
see the glossary at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
features/farmbill/2002glossary.htm. 2
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Effects of Decoupled Payments 
on the Household
Decoupled payments’ effects on a household can be traced through the flow
of its income and expenditure (fig. 1) (USDA, 2003).  Payments contribute
to total household income, along with other income sources that include
nonfarm wages, interest, and dividends.  Households decide whether to allo-
cate income to current consumption or to savings.  Age, preferences, wealth,
and tax implications typically influence this decision.  Income increases the
ability to currently consume.  Market expectations about future decoupled
payments may be reflected in the household’s land asset values, and thus in
increased wealth.  So both current and expected future payments affect the
household’s consumption decisions.  Consumption of goods and leisure is
often overlooked when assessing decoupled payments, but a household’s
allocation of payments to current consumption is an important consideration
that competes with the use of the subsidy in the farm operation.  Further-
more, a change in consumption — such as food/household supplies, rent,
mortgage, or leisure time – captures part of the subsidy’s effect on farm
household well-being.
Savings represent, in part, a plan to pay for consumption in the future. And
when a household’s income is variable year to year, precautionary savings
can help smooth short-term consumption, allowing the household to main-
tain some threshold consumption when income is low. Households typically
invest their savings across a portfolio. In general, households allocate invest-
ments based on a comparison of expected rates of return.  Farm households
can be expected to increase onfarm investment until its expected returns are
no longer as great as those available from off-farm opportunities.  Since
lump-sum decoupled payments do not directly affect either onfarm or off-
farm rates of return, they theoretically would not affect onfarm investment





Farm assets Nonfarm assets
Savings Taxes
EXPENDITURE
Choices influenced by household characteristics
 and preferences, including risk attitudes interest rates, tax consequences
INCOME
(Wages, interest and dividends,government transfers, gifts and bequests)
Figure 1
Flow of household income and expenditure3
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Increases in income and wealth may also change a household’s tolerance for
risk. Much attention has been given to how risk affects agricultural produc-
tion, with mixed findings.2  However, a household can also adjust its savings
and investment portfolio or its work choices, to suit its new risk tolerance,
perhaps in lieu of changes in farm production. 
Decoupled payments are more likely to influence production decisions when
“market failures” exist.  These include inefficiencies, rigidities, or incom-
plete information in factor (labor, capital, and land), insurance, or
commodity markets in agriculture.  Market failures may lead to links
between decoupled payments to the household and its farm production deci-
sions.  For example, credit constraints are a market failure that prevents
producers from making profitable investments in the farm.   Decoupled
payments may alleviate this constraint and enable the household to allocate
the additional liquidity to the farm.  Testing for the presence of market fail-
ures, such as credit constraints, is an indirect way to determine whether
changes in household income and wealth from payments could influence
production.
Analyzing PFC Payments, 1996-2001
The studies in this report analyze the direct effects of decoupled payments
in the FAIR Act on household behavior, and assess land, labor, risk manage-
ment, and capital market conditions that can lead to links between decou-
pled payments and production choices.  Each study contributes a different
perspective to understanding the response of U.S. farm households and
production to decoupled income transfers.  Some use new microdata on
farm households collected through USDA’s Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Survey (ARMS), initiated in 1996, and its predecessor survey. These
data are used to compare household and producer behavior and outcomes
before and after the FAIR Act.  In this approach, attributing causation to
program changes is difficult because it requires controlling for other factors
that may also have affected the outcomes.  Other studies use applied or
conceptual models to characterize the impact of introducing decoupled
payments relative to no payment, based on a stylized set of assumptions
about economic behavior. 
Westcott and Young (chapter 1) provide a conceptual introduction for the
chapters that follow, describing and comparing the production incentives of
coupled and decoupled payments.  They consider policy and market condi-
tions that could lead to links between decoupled payments and production,
discussing four avenues through which effects could occur. Westcott and
Young conclude that effects of decoupled programs on planted acreage are
smaller than acreage effects of price- and production-linked coupled
programs, which are typically not very large relative to total acreage because
of the inelasticity of U.S. supply response. Thus, although no program
appears to be completely without potential effects on agricultural production,
they argue that effects of decoupled programs are likely to be small. 
Full planting flexibility under the FAIR Act allowed producers to grow any
crop or fallow land without affecting the size of or eligibility for decoupled
payments.  Westcott and Young provide evidence pointing to the increased
2 See for example, Roberts, et al.
(2004).4
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market orientation of U.S. agricultural production.  They compare 2001
actual plantings with PFC acreage, finding that farmers exercised significant
flexibility in acreage allocations compared to their historically based PFC
acreage.
Roe, Somwaru, and Diao (chapter 2) use a stylized model to simulate the
longterm path of consumption, savings, and investment behavior of U.S.
farm households receiving decoupled payments. They consider two
scenarios regarding capital markets: one in which farm households are
unconstrained in their ability to allocate the saved portion of their payment
across an investment portfolio, and a second in which farm households are
assumed to invest only onfarm, either due to preferences, liquidity
constraints, or segmented capital markets.  All other markets are assumed to
be efficient.  Because the payments do not increase returns to farm assets,
the results for the first scenario shows no increase in onfarm investment or
production.  The results for the second scenario show a shortrun increase in
agricultural capital stock of 0.3 percent.  But in the long run, the payments
are found to have almost no effect on farm investment or production, even
with imperfect capital markets.  This is because excess investment on the
farm is self-correcting: increased onfarm investment drives down the returns
to farm capital, reducing farm households’ incentive to save and increasing
their rate of consumption out of the payment until returns are equalized
across all investments.  
Households consume leisure as well as goods.  Decoupled payments make
leisure, like other goods, more affordable.  They increase the value of
leisure relative to the cost of leisure – the marginal value of additional wage
earnings, which in theory may lead to a reduction in hours worked both on-
and off-farm.  Ahearn, Harrington, Hoppe, and Korb (chapter 3) estimate
the impacts of decoupled payments on participating households’ labor allo-
cations on and off the farm. After controlling for various factors that may
influence labor allocation, they report that decoupled PFC payments
decreased the number of off-farm hours worked and on-farm work hours
rose modestly.  These results imply that farm households respond the same
way to decoupled payments as they do to coupled payments.  These findings
call for further study of farm labor markets, particularly of the ways they
may differ from nonfarm labor markets in, for example, their provision of
nonmonetary benefits.
Changes in a household’s income and wealth can also change its tolerance
for risk.  Farmers’ risk aversion may affect production decisions because
wealth-induced changes in their risk tolerance due to decoupled payments
could influence production levels, input use, or crop mix.  Makki,
Somwaru, and Vandeveer (chapter 4) review empirical studies of risk aver-
sion of U.S. farmers.  These studies have generally found evidence of risk
aversion for most U.S. farmers, but with a wide range of risk attitudes.
Thus, although farmers who receive PFC payments likely display varying
attitudes toward risk, it is certainly plausible that some such farmers are
willing to assume more risk. Yet, Makki et al. conclude that the resulting
effects on production are likely to be small for several reasons.  Payments
are on average low (less than 3 percent) relative to the net worth of partici-
pants.  Farm production is only one of many outlets farm households use to5
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take on additional risk. Surveys find that producers use various tools—such
as insurance, hedging, and management strategies—to mitigate risks. And,
farm households can respond to changes in their risk attitudes with adjust-
ments throughout their portfolio, such as off-farm employment and investing
in nonfarm real estate or financial assets.  Finally, they review the small
empirical literature on risk-related production effects of decoupled
payments, which finds minimal production impacts.
Financial capital markets are characterized by imperfections that can induce
outside investors and creditors to ration capital or credit and impose other
costs that could cause onfarm investment to be linked to farm household
cash income.  Collender and Morehart (chapter 5) examine empirical
evidence of the extent to which these imperfections may affect farm invest-
ment and production.  Previous research indicates that farm investment
patterns do not rely on farm cash income except in relatively rare circum-
stances, both for the sector and for individual farms.  In particular, during
severe farm recessions, capital market imperfections are associated with
inefficiently low investment, especially for farmers with limited credit histo-
ries or in weak financial positions. More recent data do not indicate patterns
of capital investment or credit use that would be consistent with the pres-
ence of significant capital or credit constraints among commodity program
participants. These observations, in turn, imply decoupled payments may
move farm sector investment to more efficient levels during severe reces-
sions in the farm economy.
Decoupled Payments, Land Values,
and Land Rents
Land values and rents reflect expectations about future returns from both
agricultural production and government payments.  PFC payments were
made on the basis of land enrolled in the program.  PFC acreage was prima-
rily land enrolled in supply management programs for wheat, rice, corn,
barley, oats, sorghum and cotton at least once during 1991-95.  PFCs were
pre-determined lump-sum payments.  In theory, the link between fixed and
foreseeable program benefits and PFC acreage would allow the payments to
be fully reflected in the market for PFC acreage (adjusting for tax consider-
ations and the buyer’s subjective discount rate on future benefits).  In the
case of land rental, the program-induced increase in profits-plus-payments
will tend to be passed through to the land owner.  If land rental markets are
efficient, and if decoupled payments are completely nondistorting, one
would expect rents to rise dollar for dollar with those payments.  Some
contend that higher land values and rents due to programs reduce the
competitiveness of U.S. producers.  However, these higher land-related costs
simply reflect the capitalization of benefits into land values and the pass-
through of benefits from tenants to landlords on leased acreage.
In a simulation of decoupled payments, Roe et al. (chapter 2) show a long-
run increase in U.S. aggregate land values from PFC payments of 8 percent,
under a scenario that assumes all markets operate efficiently.  Roberts
(chapter 6) examines the effects of government payments (excluding conser-
vation) on 1997 cash-lease rental rates for base acres. He compares them to
payments’ effects on cash-lease rental rates prior to the FAIR Act, when6
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payments were more closely tied to production levels. The effect of PFC
payments on land rents is important to consider because it reflects the divi-
sion of payment benefits between tenants and landowners, and most acreage
enrolled in the PFC program was rented. Roberts finds that approximately
one-third of each payment dollar on leased acreage in 1997 was passed
through to landlords via higher land rents.  Although this rate is somewhat
higher than the 22-percent pass-through rate prior to the FAIR act, it is far
less than the dollar-for-dollar increase of a full pass-through, indicating that
program benefits are shared between tenants and landlords. The incomplete
pass-through rate could indicate that decoupled payments distort production
activities and profits or that the land markets operate imperfectly, and adjust
slowly.  Further study is needed to trace out the full implications of this
finding.
Farm Households: Changing Directions
for Policy and Analysis
U.S. farm programs are changing.  Since the mid-1980s, U.S. farm
commodity policy has evolved from a program of price supports and
controlled supply to include multiple objectives (most notably to include
environmental protection) and the facilitation of freer markets in agriculture.
The introduction of PFC payments in 1996 further weakened the links
between commodity programs and production decisions by basing these
payments to farm households on historical criteria.  
The studies in this report explore aspects of the microeconomic behavior of
farm households as it relates to the impacts of income transfers.  The studies
describe recipient households’ consumption, savings, and investment
behavior as their income and wealth increase.  The studies include analyses
of market conditions, testing for the presence of inefficiencies or market
failures that would link changes in household income to production deci-
sions.  Collectively, the chapters represent an early stage in the empirical
analysis of decoupled payments.  The studies address many aspects of the
payments’ household impacts but other issues call for additional analysis. As
the analytical paradigm changes with the evolution of farm programs, the
development of appropriate data and models will improve our understanding
of farm program impacts on the behavior and well-being of U.S. farm
households, and the agricultural sector.7
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Chapter 1




Paul C. Westcott and C. Edwin Young
Direct government payments to the U.S. agricultural sector and other farm
program benefits boosted farm income in 1999-2001, particularly during
1999-2001 when direct government payments exceeded $20 billion annually
(fig. 1-1).  More than a third of these direct payments were disbursed as
emergency assistance, which augmented direct government payments from
existing farm commodity programs, such as production flexibility contract
(PFC) payments and marketing loan benefits (loan deficiency payments and
marketing loan gains), as well as payments from conservation programs.
Besides these direct government payments, other support to the sector
included crop insurance premium subsidies and price supports for selected
commodities, such as dairy, sugar, and tobacco.
This chapter describes and compares how different types of farm programs
can create economic incentives that may affect production decisions.  We
focus on production incentives and supply response because, in general,
additional outcomes (including prices, domestic use, and exports) reflect










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Emergency assistance Marketing loan benefits
 
Production flexibility contracts Conservation programs
$ billion
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.8
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U.S. Farm Programs: Different Links to
Production and Prices
Different types of government payments and other farm program benefits
influence agricultural markets in different ways.  A billion dollars in loan
deficiency payments, for example, will affect production decisions and
market outcomes differently than $1 billion in PFC payments.  This varia-
tion in effects among different programs largely reflects how closely
program benefits are linked with farmers’ behavior and market outcomes.
Farm programs are coupled if there is a direct link between the determina-
tion of the program benefit and the farmer’s production and market condi-
tions (such as prices).  In turn, the benefits of coupled programs affect
per-unit net returns associated with specific production choices.  That is,
coupled programs may increase farmers’ profit from growing crops such as
corn or soybeans.  As a result, these programs have the greatest potential to
affect agricultural production and agricultural markets.
In contrast, decoupled payments are fixed income transfers that do not
depend on the farmer’s production choices, output levels, or market condi-
tions.  Decoupled program benefits do not subsidize production activities,
inputs, or practices.  These income transfers do not change per-unit net
returns, so they have no direct effect on production decisions for specific
commodities.
However, because decoupled payments raise the overall income and
economic well-being of farm households, indirect influences on agricultural
production can occur through wealth and other effects.  Overall, effects of
decoupled payments on production are likely to be small in aggregate
because of the many different uses of the payments. This is particularly true
when one considers the farm household, rather than only the farm operation,
as the decisionmaking entity.  A household has a wide array of consump-
tion, savings, nonagricultural and agricultural investment, and off-farm and
onfarm labor allocations that may adjust in response to decoupled payments.
U.S. agricultural commodity policy has been moving toward increasing
market orientation with the introduction of programs that have reduced the
degree of coupling of benefits to production (see box, “U.S. Agricultural
Policy Evolution Toward Greater Market Orientation”).  This trend reflects,
in part, the related policy goals of reducing market distortions and fulfilling
commitments to international trade agreements. 9
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U.S. Agricultural Policy Evolution Toward
Greater Market Orientation
Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing through the 1990s, a series of important
changes in U.S. farm commodity programs moved agriculture from the highly
managed sector of the early 1980s toward one with greater market orientation,
particularly with regard to programs affecting farmers’production decisions (Young
and Westcott; Orden, Paarlberg and Roe; Westcott, Young, and Price).  
Following the experience with high commodity loan rates of the early 1980s that
supported market prices and led to large stocks of grains, farm legislation in 1985
lowered commodity loan rates for wheat, feed grains, soybeans, upland cotton, and
rice.  Additionally, the 1985 Act introduced marketing loans for rice and upland
cotton, which effectively moved the loan program for those crops from providing
price support to providing income support without supporting market prices (West-
cott and Price).  Target prices used for income-supporting deficiency payments
also were reduced and program yields for these payments were frozen.  Still, plant-
ings of program crops remained constrained for program participants by provisions
which combined to encourage farmers to plant the same program crops over time.
Farm legislation in 1990 furthered the move toward market orientation in supply
response by introducing planting flexibility on a part of farmers’ base acres.
Producers could respond to market signals in planting choices on “normal flex
acres,” which represented 15 percent of a farmer’s base acres.  These acres were
not eligible for income support payments and planting alternative crops on this
land did not penalize the farmer through a loss of historical program base.  Addi-
tional planting flexibility was permitted on “optional flex acres” (another 10
percent of base acres), although deficiency payments were forgone on any of this
land that was planted to another crop.  A further market-oriented change under this
legislation was the extension of marketing loans to oilseeds in 1991 and to wheat
and feed grains in 1993, moving loan programs for these crops to ones providing
direct income support rather than price support.
The 1996 Farm Act fundamentally redesigned income support for major crops with
the termination of acreage reduction programs and target-price-based deficiency
payments and the introduction of decoupled production flexibility contract (PFC)
payments, with almost total planting flexibility. Base acres for program crops,
which had been a constraining aspect of annual supply management programs,
were eliminated and replaced with PFC acreage that was used as the basis for
making PFC payments.  With only a few limitations, planting of most alternative
crops was permitted on a farmer’s entire acreage base.  These policy changes
provided greater freedom for farmers to make production decisions based on
market signals.
During the latter years covered by the 1996 act, a series of supplemental emer-
gency assistance packages provided market loss assistance (MLA) payments to
farmers.  As for PFC payments, most MLA payments were distributed to farmers
based on enrolled PFC acreage and did not depend on current production.
The 2002 Farm Act extended many of the types of programs of the 1996 Farm Act
and the ad hoc emergency spending bills of 1998-2001.  Marketing assistance loans
were continued, decoupled direct payments replaced PFC payments, and counter-
cyclical payments were intended to institutionalize market loss assistance payments.
Importantly, the 2002 act also retained nearly full planting flexibility without base
acre constraints to allow farmers to continue to respond to market signals in their
production choices.  The legislation also allowed farmers to update base acres used
for direct payments and counter-cyclical payments to reflect 1998-2001 plantings,
although only 39 percent of base acres were updated.10
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Coupled Programs Affect Aggregate 
Land Use and Crop Mix
Coupled programs that are closely linked to the farmer’s production of
specific crops affect total land use and also distort the mix of crops planted.
Program benefits that are linked to production of specific crops increase
expected returns to those commodities.  That is, an increase in production
receives additional program benefits, which provide incentives to expand
output.  As a result, production decisions for those commodities are based
on expected returns from both the marketplace and government payments.
Cross-commodity effects may also occur because changes in expected
returns for one crop affect relative net returns among cropping alternatives.
Some farmers would likely respond to a coupled payment by increasing
total planted area and/or shifting the mix of crops toward those with higher
coupled payments.
Two economic studies analyzing coupled programs (crop insurance and
marketing loans) demonstrate how their benefits directly augment market
returns and thereby influence planting decisions.  Crop insurance changes
the distribution of expected income when yields are low.  U.S. subsidies for
crop insurance premiums are proportional to the premium.  Since premiums
are higher for crops that are riskier to insure, premium subsidies are higher
for those crops, which encourages production of riskier crops and produc-
tion in riskier regions.  Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf report that govern-
ment crop insurance subsidies of about $1.5 billion a year would add about
960,000 acres (about 0.4 percent) to annual production of eight major field
crops, with plantings of wheat and cotton expanding the most.
Marketing loans provide another type of coupled benefit by raising farmers’
revenues for current production when market prices are low.  When
commodity prices are below commodity loan rates, program benefits
augment market receipts and, thus, create an incentive to produce specific
crops.  Annual effects of marketing loans reported by Westcott and Price
vary by year, depending on the absolute and relative magnitudes of the
expected crop-specific marketing loan benefits.  With marketing loan bene-
fits ranging from around $5 billion to over $8 billion in 1999-2001, total
acreage planted to eight major field crops was increased by an estimated 
2 to 4 million acres (less than 2 percent) annually in those years.  Acreage
effects for individual crops reflect year-specific expected relative benefits
among cropping alternatives each year.  In some situations, marketing loan
benefits can result in larger effects on individual crops than in aggregate.
The moderate effects of these coupled programs (less than 2 percent
increases in acres) partly reflect an inelastic acreage response in the farm
sector, where overall crop plantings change proportionally less than the
economic incentives provided by prices and net returns.  Despite recent
increases in the responsiveness of plantings to price changes, facilitated by
nearly full planting flexibility (Lin et al.), overall supply responsiveness
remains inelastic.11
Decoupled Payments in a Changing Policy Setting/AER-838
Economic Research Service/USDA
Decoupled Payments Raise Household 
Well-Being, Potentially Production
Benefits of decoupled programs do not depend on current production or
market prices.  Production decisions for specific crops are not directly
affected by these transfer payments because net returns per unit of produc-
tion are not changed.  Nonetheless, decoupled payments may have indirect
effects on agricultural production and markets through:
 changes in producers’ wealth, leading to higher farm investment 
and changing risk attitudes, 
 effects on slowing or accelerating farm consolidation,  
 expectations about future program eligibility and payment basis 
that influence current production decisions, and 
 repeated ad hoc programs that change producer expectations 
over time.
The direct effect of decoupled payments is to raise the overall income and
economic well-being of farm households.  A farm household can decide to
use these transfers in the farm operation or for nonfarm alternatives such as
consumption, savings, and nonagricultural investments.  Household work
choices, both off-farm and onfarm, may also change. These resource alloca-
tion decisions of the household are important for determining the potential
indirect effects of decoupled payments on production decisions.   
Any indirect effects of decoupled payments on production would be more
general than the commodity-specific effects of coupled programs, affecting
total land use or overall productivity gains, for example.  The choice to
grow more of any crop would reflect expected market returns across
competing uses rather than the decoupled payment (see box, “Production
Flexibility Contract Acreage and 2001 Plantings”).  As with coupled
programs, lower prices resulting from any production increases can
moderate subsequent production effects and other market impacts.
Farm programs typically encompass many features that can affect the
market, and individual mechanisms can often overlap.  Coupled programs
can influence production through these same mechanisms (in addition to
their more direct effects through raising net returns), and many farm
programs have both coupled and decoupled properties.
Wealth Effects on Investment 
and Risk Attitudes
Mechanisms by which decoupled payments may potentially affect produc-
tion decisions include: (1) a wealth-facilitated investment effect, reflecting
reduced credit constraints and/or reduced costs of capital, and (2) a direct
wealth effect that changes risk aversion.
Decoupled payments can affect agricultural production by increasing the
wealth of farmers, typically through the capitalization of expected farm
program benefits into the value of farmland.12
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Production Flexibility Contract Acreage
and 2001 Plantings
National, State, and county data show many significant differences in 2001
plantings compared to Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) acreage under
the 1996 Farm Act, largely due to shifts in acreage allocations as producers
used planting flexibility provided in that legislation.  These results suggest a
lack of a strong link between program acreage and current planting decisions.
Instead, production choices reflect the ability of farmers to respond to
expected market returns among competing crops (augmented by expected
marketing loan benefits when prices are low), as well as to agronomic and
rotational considerations.
PFC payments under the 1996 Farm Act were allocated on a commodity
basis, but were linked to historically based contract acreage that reflected
past commodity program enrollment rather than being linked to current
production.  PFC payments were made for seven program crops: wheat, corn,
sorghum, barley, oats, rice, and upland cotton.  PFCs also gave producers
nearly complete planting flexibility in their production decisions without loss
of program acreage or program benefits.  For example, land that had been
enrolled in the wheat deficiency payments program for any of the crop years
1991-95 could be entered into a 7-year production flexibility contract with
the government in 1996.  PFC payments on this contract acreage were
considered to be for wheat.  The land was required to remain in an agricul-
tural use and there were restrictions on planting most fruits and vegetables,
but planting flexibility allowed producers to shift to other crops or leave the
land idle.
Nationally, 2001 plantings to the seven PFC program crops represented about
82 percent of total PFC acreage.  On a crop-specific basis, shares ranged from
a low of 45 percent of barley PFC acreage planted to barley to a high of about
96 percent of upland cotton PFC acreage planted to upland cotton.  U.S. wheat
plantings in 2001 represented about 76 percent of the level of wheat PFC
acreage, and corn plantings represented about 93 percent of corn PFC acreage.
Looking more closely at data for upland cotton, the crop with 2001 national
plantings relatively the closest to its crop-specific PFC acreage, significant
variation in this share is shown by state-level and county-level data (box fig.
1).  At the state level, upland cotton plantings were more than 20 percent
below cotton PFC acreage in Arizona, New Mexico, California, and Okla-
homa, but were more than 20 percent higher than cotton PFC acreage in
Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Kansas.
Further disaggregation to the county level also indicates an absence of a
strong link between cotton PFC acreage and 2001 upland cotton plantings
(see cotton map).  For example, cotton acres greatly expanded above histori-
cally based cotton PFC acreage in the Southeastern states of North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia as farmers used planting flexibility provided
under the 1996 farm act, with no constraints related to PFC acreage or annual
acreage reduction programs.
Similarly, variation in plantings relative to crop-specific PFC acreage is shown
for wheat at the state level and the county level (box fig. 2).  Of the 42 States
with NASS-reported production data, 32 have wheat plantings more than 20
percent lower or 20 percent higher than the State-level wheat PFC acreage.
County-level wheat plantings in 2001 also show no strong link to wheat PFC
acreage (see wheat map), again reflecting the use of planting flexibility with no
supply management program constraints, such as acreage reduction programs.13
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Greater cash flow provided by decoupled payments and higher wealth may
also facilitate more production through increases in agricultural investment
if farmers otherwise face credit constraints or limited liquidity.  Some of the
payments are likely to go to consumption, savings, and nonagricultural
investments, with the largest share typically going to consumption.  But,
agricultural investment could also rise.  For credit-constrained farmers,
lenders may be more willing to make loans to farmers with higher guaran-
teed incomes, higher farm equity, and lower risk of default.  Great loan
availability facilitates more production by allowing these farmers to more
easily invest in profitable opportunities on their farm.  Although Collender
and Morehart (chapter 5) did not find evidence of significant credit








Source: ERS, based on 2001 county-level data from NASS and FSA. 
Data not available for all counties.










Source: ERS, based on 2001 county-level data from NASS and FSA. 
Data not available for all counties.
Wheat production flexibility contract acreage planted to
wheat varied widely
Box figure 23 Again, use of the payments in the
farm operation would be competing
with alternative uses by the farm
household, including consumption and
nonagricultural investments.
14
Decoupled Payments in a Changing Policy Setting/AER-838
Economic Research Service/USDA
that some farmers are likely credit constrained and would alter their produc-
tion with decoupled payments.
For some farmers, increased liquidity provided by decoupled payments may
also reduce the need for loans to cover short-term operating costs or longer
term farm-related investments.3 While there are opportunity costs when
self-financing the farm operation, they would be lower than expenses for
commercial loans.  In these situations, the lower cost of capital could
increase the size of the farm operation or raise investment in the farm, either
of which could increase farm output.
If changes in wealth due to decoupled payments influence producers’
perception of or attitudes toward risk, they may take on more risk in their
agricultural and nonagricultural portfolios.  Such farmers may choose to
adjust their overall production and/or may switch to riskier crops with
higher average (but more variable) expected returns.  Chavas and Holt
(1990) found evidence of declining absolute risk aversion with higher
wealth, implied by positive wealth effects on the plantings of corn and
soybeans.4 Makki, Somwaru, and Vandeveer (chapter 4) discuss in more
detail the potential for risk-related production impacts of PFC payments,
arguing that these effects are likely modest. 
Farm Consolidation Effects
Consolidation in the agricultural sector has been a long-term trend, partly
reflecting increased productivity.  How decoupled payments may affect this
ongoing trend is uncertain, but important. 
Two competing arguments concern the potential effects of decoupled
payments on consolidation.  On the one hand, decoupled payments could
slow sector consolidation if the payments allow marginally viable, smaller
farms to remain in business longer.  Such farms may be able to cover short-
term variable expenses associated with the yearly decision to produce, but
may not be able to cover longrun economic costs, remaining in the sector
because of rising land values.  Decoupled payments could help these farms
by relieving a credit constraint or by providing lower cost funds.5 In
general, these farms tend to be less efficient.  So, keeping them in operation
would likely lower aggregate production if the land would have been used
by more efficient, larger producers with higher yields. 
In contrast, decoupled payments could accelerate sector consolidation if
larger operations use the payments to buy smaller operations or to rent more
acreage.  This would occur especially if these large operations were previ-
ously credit constrained or if the lower opportunity cost of using these funds
(relative to the costs of commercial loans) were sufficient to motivate
expansion.6 Any resulting increase in consolidation would be expected to
raise aggregate production because larger operations typically are more effi-
cient due to better management and other economies of size.  Larger opera-
tions tend to more readily adopt new technology and use production
practices that raise yields (Caswell et al.).  Additional effects may reflect
increased production incentives due to lower costs per unit of output.
Caswell et al. report that larger farms tend to have higher application rates
4 Chavas and Holt (1990) derived
wealth effect elasticities of 0.087 for
U.S. corn plantings and 0.27 for U.S.
soybean plantings.  Because much
farmland is leased, many payments go
directly or indirectly to nonoperator
landlords rather than to farm opera-
tors; those payments would not be
expected to have production effects.
The Chavas and Holt model estimates
reflect the implicit portion of pay-
ments captured by operators.  In 1954
to 1985 (the estimation period used by
Chavas and Holt), an average of about
37 percent of total farmland was
leased, based on ERS calculations
using Census data.  This compares
with about 41 percent of total farm-
land being leased in 1997, based on
the same data source.  Thus, any
upward bias in the Chavas and Holt
elasticities would be minimal because
the increase in the share of farmland
leased since their estimation period
has not been very large.
5 Credit constraints for small farms
may not be significant in the aggregate
because of off-farm income that is typ-
ical for these households.
6 As earlier, use of the payments in
the farm operation would be compet-
ing with alternative uses by the farm
household, including consumption and
nonagricultural investments.15
Decoupled Payments in a Changing Policy Setting/AER-838
Economic Research Service/USDA
for a number of inputs, consistent with their lower production costs resulting
from higher efficiency. 
Net effects on consolidation from these competing arguments are uncertain,
but are not likely to be large (Yee et al., 2004).  Relief of credit constraints
is probably not a major factor.  Although there are likely to be some credit-
constrained U.S. farms, a number of empirical tests show no evidence of
significant credit constraints in the sector in the aggregate (Collender and
Morehart), suggesting minimal effects from the marginal change in credit
constraints.  Also, a large share of PFC acres is rented, about 60 percent in
1996 (USDA, 2003).  As a result, a portion of program benefits are passed
through to nonoperator landlords, limiting their effects on consolidation (see
discussion of pass-through of PFC payments to landlords in Roberts,
chapter 6).  
Any effects on agricultural output that could result from a change in
consolidation trends would apply only to land that moved into a larger
operation through sale or rent or to land that was held back from sale on
smaller operations.  Additionally, the payments may simply shift the timing
of land transfers with any resulting production effects being only tempo-
rary.  Thus, any effects of decoupled payments on consolidation are likely
to alter trends already underway only marginally, with little effect on
aggregate yields and production. 
Benefit Eligibility and Payment Basis
Some farm programs provide benefits that are not linked to current produc-
tion decisions, input use, or market prices but are weakly coupled to produc-
tion decisions through land use constraints.  For example, PFCs under the
1996 Farm Act required land to remain in agricultural uses as a condition of
eligibility for PFC payments.7 Although this requirement permitted the land
to be idled, such program provisions can affect overall crop production by
providing incentives to prevent some land from leaving the sector.  Once the
decision is made to keep the land in agriculture and not to convert it to a
permanent nonagricultural use, the farmer then may decide to produce on
that land if expected revenues exceed production costs.  Even if the land is
permitted to be idled, it is more readily available to return to agricultural
production if economic conditions warrant.  Similarly, restrictions on the
plantings of most fruits and vegetables on base acres under planting flexi-
bility provisions could influence production if the land would otherwise
have been planted to those crops.
The basis for the distribution of farm program benefits may also affect
producers’ expectations of how future benefits will be disbursed.  Payments
linked to past production may lead to expectations that future benefits will
be linked to current production.  Such expectations would affect expected
net returns for program crops and could thereby affect current production
decisions.  For example, farmers may not fully use planting flexibility to
move away from historically planted and supported crops if they expect
future farm programs to permit an updating of their base acreage, which
forms the foundation for many payments.  Instead, farmers would have
incentives to build and maintain a planting history for program crops,
7 This requirement was continued
under the 2002 Farm Act as a condition
for receipt of direct payments and
counter-cyclical payments.16
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perhaps limiting their response to current market signals.  Similarly, use of
nonland inputs that affect current yields may be influenced if farmers expect
that future farm legislation will permit an updating of payment yields.  Such
updates may also reduce incentives to grow different varieties of program
crops that have marketable characteristics but lower yields.
Overall effects of such expectations are likely to be small due to the uncer-
tainty that future farm legislation would permit updating base acreage and
program yields, the uncertainty of the provisions of any such legislation, as
well as the discounting of benefits payable in the future.  Nonetheless, if
farmers expect to be able to update their farm-level program parameters, the
economic efficiency of production could be reduced if producers do not
fully respond to market signals.  The importance and potential effects of
these policy expectations also depend on expected market prices, which
would affect the expected value of future program benefits.  If expected
market prices are low, the value of future benefits would be relatively high,
so building or maintaining base acreage or program yields would be of
value.  However, if expected market prices are higher, future program bene-
fits would be lower and the associated value of base acreage and program
yields would be smaller.
Repeated Ad Hoc Programs Can 
Change Producer Expectations 
Programs whose payments are announced and distributed after production
decisions have been made (such as unanticipated ad hoc emergency assis-
tance) can be argued to not distort production and thus may initially be
decoupled. However, continued use of these programs when prices or
production are low may change farmers’ perceptions of the programs’
design.  These payments change producers’ realized revenues and repeated
payments may alter the distribution of future expected revenues by raising
expectations that such payments will recur in similar market situations.8 In
so doing, farmers may perceive such programs as less ad hoc and more
coupled to market conditions.9
As a consequence, these payments reduce potential downside revenue risks,
which may affect production decisions for risk-averse producers, as
expected payments become part of their risk management portfolio.  The
revenue stabilization consideration for risk-averse producers would supple-
ment the typical profit maximization incentive underlying planting deci-
sions.  Thus, if risk-averse producers have probabilistic expectations of
future assistance based on past government actions, particularly if there is a
connection (or perception of a connection) between the probability of such
payments and market conditions (low prices or production), then production
choices may be influenced. 
Programs that reduce the risk of low revenue outcomes when prices or
production fall to low levels can lead to production effects by raising the
lowest levels of expected revenues, thereby reducing financial risk associ-
ated with those market situations.  The more these ad hoc benefits are
viewed as linked to specific production activities, the greater their potential
influence on production choices for those activities, as the expectation of 
9 See page 4 of USDA (2003) for
an illustration of how the degree of
coupling of farm programs changes,
reflecting the links of the benefits to
production and prices. 
8 For example, with emergency
assistance packages enacted in the
United States six times in 1998 to
2001, farmers may now expect this
type of government assistance to be
more likely when prices or production
are low.10 Note that the likelihood of ad
hoc assistance is quite variable as it is
subject to political and budgetary con-
cerns.  Farm households are likely to
have better risk management instru-
ments.
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benefits becomes part of the farm household’s risk management portfolio.10
Expected assistance that addresses crop-specific production problems, such
as droughts or floods, can be viewed as similar to fully subsidized crop
insurance, affecting planting decisions by reducing risk, and potentially
leading to increased production of those crops by risk-averse producers.  In
contrast, expectations of less specific assistance would likely affect aggre-
gate production through a more general reduction of overall revenue risks. 
Conclusions
Different types of farm programs influence agricultural markets in different
ways.  Decoupled farm programs provide income transfers that raise the
overall income and economic well-being of farm households.  Decoupled
payments do not have direct effects on production decisions or agricultural
output because they do not change returns to production.  However, decou-
pled programs can have indirect effects on farm production decisions and
aggregate output.  This contrasts with coupled farm programs, such as crop
insurance and marketing loans, which create direct incentives to expand
farm output of specific commodities by increasing expected returns per unit
of production, in addition to their potential indirect effects.  
Indirect influences of decoupled payments on production may result from
the effects of increased wealth on risk attitudes or investment, farm consoli-
dation, and expectations about program eligibility and payment basis, and
repeated use of ad hoc programs.  Despite a variety of potential indirect
effects of decoupled programs on farmers’ decisions, production effects are
likely smaller than direct effects of price- and production-linked coupled
programs such as marketing loans.  This is particularly true when one
considers the payments within a household framework, and that consump-
tion, savings, nonagricultural and agricultural investment, and off-farm and
on-farm labor allocations may adjust to changes in income and wealth.
Further, overall planting effects of coupled programs are typically not very
large compared with total acreage because of the inelasticity of supply
response in the U.S. farm sector.  
Thus, although no program appears to be completely without potential
effects on agricultural production,11 effects of decoupled programs are likely
to be small.  Further research is needed, however, to measure such effects
empirically.  A useful framework for such analysis is presented in OECD
(2001), which discusses effects on agricultural policies of programs with
different degrees of coupling to production decisions.
To the extent that agricultural production is affected by decoupled
payments, this supply response has additional market effects on prices,
domestic use, and exports. For example, any increase in production resulting
from programs would tend to lower market prices.  These price declines,
along with planting flexibility provided by the 1996 and 2002 Farm Acts,
can moderate subsequent production effects.
11 A report by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment discusses the theoretical effects
of decoupling and reaches a similar
conclusion that “it seems difficult to
contend that any policy measure can
be entirely production or trade neu-
tral.”18
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Decoupled payments, introduced in the 1996 Farm Act and renewed in
2002, are lump-sum income transfers to farm operators independent of
their current production, factor use, or commodity prices.  This chapter
considers whether decoupled payments may alter producers’ resource allo-
cation over time and lead to effects on production.  We use a dynamic,
economywide applied general equilibrium (AGE) model to simulate the
effects of annual decoupled payments in U.S. agriculture over time.  The
dynamic, intertemporal dimension is necessary because a stream of annual
payments can be expected to influence recipients’ decisions about how
much to consume versus save over a long-term time horizon.  An economy-
wide approach is important because the payments redistribute income from
urban to rural households, and may result in sectoral changes in resource
allocation within the economy.  The main link between decoupled
payments and agricultural production in this framework is through recip-
ient households’ decisions to invest in agricultural assets.  
Can Decoupled Payments Have Neutral 
Market Effects? 
Decoupled payments increase the income and wealth of recipient house-
holds.  In response, over time, these households are likely to consume more
goods and to increase savings. However, whether these individual household
decisions affect resource allocation and aggregate levels of agricultural
production depends on the behavior of those that are taxed to provide the
transfer.  Effects on recipients can exactly offset the consumption and
investment effects of those taxed such that, after the transfer, resource allo-
cation and production at the market level are unaffected.   Generally
speaking, this result occurs when recipient households have consumption
and savings patterns in proportion to their income that is identical to those
paying for the subsidy.   Under these circumstances, the wealth effect of a
transfer on recipient behavior is offset by the negative wealth effect on those
taxed to provide the transfer.12 Of course, in real economies, identical
taxed/recipient preferences are unlikely.
A neutral outcome depends on other conditions as well, including the avail-
ability of financial capital markets that work perfectly to allocate savings to
investors in all sectors of the economy, the presence of opportunities to
insure against future risks, and the absence of fixed costs.  These conditions,
too, are unlikely to prevail in real markets.  For example, agricultural capital
markets differ from nonfarm capital markets.  Unlike corporations, farmers
cannot issue securities or bonds to finance farm activities; instead, they must
rely on land and other assets for collateral. Thus, segmented capital markets
can lead to different capital effects on individuals outside agriculture, who
12 Also, individual preferences can
be identical but differ in the share of
disposable income spent on goods and
services at different income levels.  In
this case, the behavior of recipients
can differ from that of taxed individu-
als, with the result that transfer pay-
ments can affect market allocations
over time.13 See Roe et al. (2002) for details
of the analysis and the underlying
AGE model. 
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are taxed, than on recipients in agriculture. This effect might be greater if
farmers face liquidity constraints or if they prefer to invest in agriculture
that share of decoupled payments not allocated to consumption.  The differ-
ence in these diverged capital markets does not imply that returns to capital
in agriculture departs from returns in other sectors of the economy, at least
in the long run, since farm households also invest in stocks, bonds, and
other financial instruments (USDA, 2003).  However, in the short run, an
increase in agriculture’s capital stock should lead to production effects —
but to what extent? 
Direct payments are targeted to land planted to program crops in the base
period, and so lead to an increase in land asset values. A change in the price
of land affects wealth.  Consequently, payments can affect the investment and
consumption behavior of those who own land, since landowners likely try to
equate (risk and tax-adjusted) returns across all assets in their portfolio,
including land.  In addition, since land is used as collateral, payments might
increase access to capital for those farmers who face credit constraints. 
An Intertemporal, Economywide Model
Analysis:  Bracketing Two Outcomes 
We use two versions of an intertemporal, economywide model of the U.S.
economy to simulate decoupled payments in U.S. agriculture.13 One version
presumes that ideal conditions hold in capital markets: the markets in agri-
culture and the rest of the economy are perfectly integrated so that any differ-
ences in shortrun rates of return to capital and land are instantly arbitraged to
zero.  In the second version, we assume recipients’investment alternatives
are strictly limited to agricultural assets.  Credit constraints, investment pref-
erences, or restricted investment opportunities could contribute to such
segmentation.  In fact, U.S. farm households hold diversified investment
portfolios – evidence that agricultural capital markets are not fully segmented
(USDA, 2003).  The two scenarios we describe should be considered as
bracketing the possible outcomes of the decoupled payments.   
The models otherwise are identical in their specifications.  Households are
presumed to hold identical preferences at all income levels for consumption
of goods and services.  Household consumption and savings decisions
respond to changes in prices and returns. Assets are aggregated into three
broad categories—capital in agriculture, capital not in agriculture, and land.
The model is calibrated to represent 1997, while rates of growth in total
factor productivity, growth in the U.S. labor force, and selected other param-
eters are taken from other research for the baseline run.   The model repro-
duces key outcomes observed for the actual economy in 1997-2001. 
We assume that decoupled payments, equal to $6.112 billion in 1997, are
made to farmers each year from 1997 on.  Thus, our results suggest the
directional effects of direct payments rather than the exact magnitude. All
results are compared with the base, or the path of the economy without
direct or other payments to farmers.20
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The Case of Integrated Capital Markets
This analysis presumes that investors allocate savings so as to arbitrage
away any differences in returns to the three assets (land, agricultural capital,
and capital in the manufacturing and service sectors).  Effectively, the rate
of return to agricultural capital is maintained at the same rate as returns to
capital in the rest of the U.S. economy.  Since household preferences are
assumed to be identical, consumption and investment behavior of the recipi-
ents of decoupled payments are exactly counterbalanced.  As a result, when
the payments are not tied to production or prices, they have no effect on
production levels, even over time.  
However, since payments are linked to “program” acres, land values are
affected.  The $6.1-billion annual payment, in the short run, causes land
values to exceed their base-level values by almost 9 percent (fig. 2-1).  Land
values then taper off to about 8.3 percent above their longrun base value.
Many studies have documented that decoupled payments, even though they
aim to benefit farm households, have an important side effect—to raise land
values. For example, Goodwin et al. (2003a, 2003b) found that decoupled
payments have had small effects on land values, ranging from 2 to 6 percent
in the Northern Great Plains and Corn Belt regions.  Bernard et al. (2001)
found larger effects in a study that included both coupled and decoupled
payments.  Our analysis also finds higher land values.
These land value effects are due solely to decoupled payments. Competition
for land (and a right to the payment) causes renters to pay higher rates to
owners.  If the land is sold, the buyer is willing to pay more if the payment
remains tied to the land.   Of course, decoupled payments and the rise in
land values change recipients’ consumption patterns and level of assets.  In
the short run, asset values of recipient households rise by about 2 percent
above their base values, due mostly to the rise in land values. Most of the
payments are spent on consumption; this proportion rises over time while
the proportion saved falls. Total consumption expenditures are about 0.8
Figure 2-1
Decoupled payments’ effects on land values are similar with 
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percent higher than expenditures in the absence of transfers (fig. 2-2). The
rise in the value of assets held by recipient households should also increase
their access to credit. If liquidity constraints are binding, then PFC
payments may not be decoupled in that sense. 
The Case of Segmented Capital Markets
In the second version of the model, we assume that capital markets in agri-
culture are segmented from those in the rest of the economy – farmers are
assumed able to invest payments only in agricultural assets.  Within agricul-
ture, and within the rest of the economy, rates of return are equalized, but
returns to agricultural assets are no longer perfectly arbitraged with nonagri-
cultural assets (although they are in the long run.) 
With segmented markets, within the first 10 years of payments, the rate of
return to agricultural capital declines by a modest 0.1 percent (fig. 2-3) below
the capital rental rate observed in the base scenario.  The effect on the returns
to capital outside agriculture and on the price index of goods is almost imper-
ceptible. And, even though direct payments continue in equal amounts
throughout the period, agriculture’s return to capital slowly converges with
that of the rest of the economy. In other words, in spite of the presumed
differences between agriculture and the rest of the economy, in the long run,
direct payments do not distort the rate of return to capital in agriculture. 
Figure 2-4 shows why direct payments cause returns to agricultural capital
to decline. In early periods, farmers tend to allocate more of their payments
to investment in agricultural assets than in later periods. In the short run, the
amount of capital invested in agriculture rises to about 0.25 percent more of
the capital stock than would otherwise be accumulated (relative to the base).
As additional capital investments lead to diminishing returns to capital
stock, farmers save less and spend more of their decoupled payments on
final goods. In the long run, the amount of capital employed in agriculture is
equal to the amount that would be employed without transfer payments; in
Figure 2-2
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other words, payments do not affect the longrun level of capital stock in the
sector. Nevertheless, the half-life of the adjustment is about 25 years
because the depreciation rate for buildings and structures is minor. The
effect on capital stocks in the rest of the economy is almost imperceptible. 
As farmers increase their levels of capital stock, more labor hours, relative
to the base, are also allocated to production (fig. 2-5). These hours come
from a combination of reduced leisure time and more hired labor.14 Decou-
pled payments encourage the employment of capital relative to labor (fig. 
2-6). This is because the assumed preference for investing in agriculture
causes the rate of return to capital to fall slightly relative to the change in
wages. The change in the wage-rental ratio encourages more substitution of
capital for labor relative to the base. In the long run, the wage-rental ratio
converges to the level expected in the absence of payments. 
Figure 2- 3
Decoupled payments lower on returns to capital in agriculture:  
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Figure 2-4
Decoupled payments have small effects on the stock of capital














14 Since leisure is typically found to
be a normal good, although not mod-
eled explicitly in this report, the com-
bination of wealth and price effects
would likely leave the average level of
leisure consumed by farmers to be vir-
tually unchanged.  The slight increase
in agricultural labor in the segmented
market case relative to the base year,
comes from the hired labor market.
Nevertheless, in absolute terms, in all
of the analysis, there is an outmigra-
tion of labor from agriculture.23
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The decline in agriculture’s rate of return to its capital stock also affects the
price of land.  As agriculture becomes more capital-intensive and returns to
agricultural capital fall (shown in fig. 2-4), the returns to land rise.  Land
prices in the first 5 years of the simulation rise to a greater extent than in the
case where capital markets are assumed to be nonsegmented, by roughly 1
percentage point in the short run (fig. 2-1). After 5 years, land values
become similar to those of a nonsegmented capital market.  Effectively, with
decoupled payments, the segmented capital market speeds up agriculture’s
capital accumulation and convergence to its longrun equilibrium.  
Finally, do the resource allocation effects of decoupled payments affect
aggregate agricultural production?  U.S. agricultural production rises by an
estimated 0.17 percent of its base value in the short run.  In the long run,
output returns to approximately the levels that would prevail in the absence
Figure 2-5
Decoupled payments cause a small increase in agricultural
employment: the segmented capital markets case 
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of payments (fig. 2-7).  The effect that prevails in the long run is the
elevated price of land (8.4 percent). 
Conclusions
Are decoupled payments to farmers likely to affect resource allocation in
agriculture?  If not, decoupled payments can be thought of as an efficient
policy instrument to transfer resources from one segment of the population
to another, with minimal distortion of production or trade. Since the real
economy is obviously complicated and encumbered with imperfect markets,
this is a complex question.  Our contribution lies in showing the circum-
stances under which payments have minimal market distortions.  We also
consider the most stringent capital market imperfections – when recipients’
investment opportunities are restricted to agriculture – and show just how
distorting these payments might be.
Our economywide analysis finds that if agricultural capital markets are
perfectly integrated with capital markets in the rest of the economy and if
the taxed and recipients hold identical preferences for goods and services,
then the key effects of payments over time are to increase the value of land
by about 8 percent and, of course, to increase the wealth of program recipi-
ents and their expenditures on final goods. 
If we presume that farmers invest in agriculture that portion of decoupled
payments not spent on consumption, payments seem to affect resource allo-
cation and production.  Over the long run, recipient households respond to
declining rates of return to agricultural capital by increasing their consump-
tion and lowering their savings rate until rates of return between agricultural
and nonagricultural assets are re-equilibrated.  As a result, the small produc-
tion increases in the short run, less than 0.2 percent, become negligible in the
long run.  The only long-term effect of payments is to increase land values. 
Figure 2-7
Decoupled payments have small and declining effects on output but 
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Mary Clare Ahearn, David Harrington, Robert Hoppe, and Penni Korb
U.S. agriculture is one of the most productive industries in the U.S.
economy and one of the most productive agricultural systems worldwide.
Labor used in U.S. agriculture, both hired and family labor, has declined in
absolute terms since 1948 (Ahearn et al., 1988).  The long-term trend of less
farm labor (in favor of other production inputs) has enabled farm operators
and other household members to allocate more of their time to off-farm
jobs.  Off-farm income has dominated cash earnings of most farm families
for over three decades and for those farm families, the pursuit of an off-farm
career may supersede the effect of farm policy (including decoupled
payments) on farm household decisions.  As a result, off-farm labor condi-
tions, as well as onfarm earnings and government payments, influence
households’ labor supply decisions. 
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between farm household labor
allocations and the decoupled and coupled commodity payments received
by households.  We first describe a theoretical model of household labor
allocation that incorporates both on- and off-farm labor markets.  We use the
model to derive predictions about the response of household labor supply to
coupled and decoupled payments.  We then present descriptive statistics as
well as statistical results—that control for factors other than government
programs—to analyze farm household labor response to payments.
Theoretical Model of Household Labor Choices 
In the standard household labor allocation model, households are assumed
to maximize “utility” – the consumption of goods and leisure. Consumption
is limited by a household budget constraint based on labor and other sources
of income and a fixed amount of time for labor and leisure15 (see Singh et
al., 1986; Huffman, 1991).   A key factor linking labor, leisure, and house-
hold income is the marginal return from working an additional hour, the
market wage rate. The wage rate is also the “opportunity cost” of allocating
an hour to leisure rather than to working. 
From this model, we can derive the demand for farm household labor in
farming, the demand for household leisure time, and the off-farm labor
supply of the farm household.  The derivations depend on assumptions
about the decision process of the household and about the “completeness”
of labor markets.  Complete labor markets imply that off-farm labor oppor-
tunities are available to farm households and that nonfamily farmworkers
are available for hire locally.
15 Individuals must allocate some
of their time to maintaining their
households. This time is considered
as part of leisure, the residual time
category. 26
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The model also distinguishes between two types of income: earned labor
income and nonlabor income, such as an income transfer or dividends.  The
household is predicted to respond to them differently.  Earned labor income
can have two effects on the labor allocation decision.  A wealth effect
occurs if an increase in wealth or income causes the household to want to
work less and enjoy more leisure.  A substitution effect occurs if the house-
hold increases work hours in response to the higher marginal return to labor
and reduces leisure in response to its higher opportunity cost.  Nonlabor
income has only a wealth effect, but no substitution effect, because it does
not change returns to labor. 
To make this model more useful for applied analysis, it can be extended to
incorporate household resource allocations among farm work, off-farm
work, and leisure time.  And, whereas the household budget is assumed to
be fixed in the standard model, a farm household’s budget can be viewed as
dependent on farm production decisions, i.e., the budget is endogenous.
Taylor and Adelman (2003) call this a “farm profit” effect.  
Decoupled/Coupled Payments
and Total Work Hours
A decoupled payment is an income transfer; its amount does not vary with
changes in hours worked onfarm.  A coupled payment is labor income that
varies with the amount of output, and hence the amount of labor input.  So,
how would decoupled and coupled payments be expected to alter the alloca-
tion of farm households’ labor?  And if farm households choose more
leisure time, would it be at the expense of farm or off-farm work?
Following are some model predictions:
 Workers will tend to decrease total hours worked in response to 
decoupled payments. If a farm household receives decoupled 
payments, the impact on labor hours worked is certain because 
there is no change in the hourly return from work.  Household 
members will prefer to work less and enjoy more leisure as a 
result of the wealth effect.  Conversely, if decoupled payments 
are removed, hours worked are likely to increase to compensate 
for reduced wealth.  
 The effect of coupled payments on total hours worked is ambigu-
ous. Increased wage rates can cause a household member to want 
to work more and consume less leisure because each hour of work 
now brings a greater return (substitution effect).  But it can also 
cause a household member to want to work less and consume more 
leisure if it has more income than before (wealth effect).  The net 
effect will be determined by a household’s individual preferences 
and the magnitude of payments.  Only by observing the behavior of 
households can we determine the impact of coupled payments on 
the allocation of time and labor.
 When more leisure time is demanded, farm households will tend 
to reduce their labor hours in the job with lower marginal returns.
If a farm household is not involved in off-farm work, fewer hours 
would be devoted to farming if more leisure time is demanded by 
the household as a result of increased income.  For multiple-job holders27
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who prefer more leisure time, theory predicts that a household will
decrease its work hours at the job with the lower marginal returns.  So,
if farm work has a higher marginal return, a household desiring more
leisure would allocate fewer hours to off-farm work. However, a defini-
tive prediction in such a case depends on assumptions about the house-
hold decision process and whether labor markets are complete.
Often, economists assume that households first make optimal farm produc-
tion decisions and then decisions about consumption. Where increased
nonlabor income results in increased leisure, the assumption of making farm
decisions first dictates that farm households will work less at their off-farm
job in lieu of reducing farm work.  However, it can alternatively be assumed
that households first allocate their labor to off-farm work and subsequently
allocate their remaining time to farm production (or make decisions simulta-
neously).  Hence, the differing assumptions can result in differing theoret-
ical predictions about which labor hours are reduced – farm, off-farm, or
both.  Because the effect of government payments on leisure time is uncer-
tain, the use of data to study actual decisions made by recipients is essential.  
Although the theoretical model predicts an adjustment away from labor hours
with a lower marginal return, data on farm and off-farm labor returns, rela-
tive to hours worked, do not support the expectation that farm households
closely align their labor allocation with their farm returns.   All U.S. farm
households receiving payments allocated, on average, 60 percent of their
work hours to farming but derived only 20 percent of their income from the
farm (table 3-1).  Only on very large farms (which represent 5 percent of all
farms) does the share of work hours on the farm correspond closely to the
share of earned income from farm sources.  Obviously, considerations in
addition to net farm income enter into the time allocation decisions of farm
households.  The allocation of family labor varies considerably by the life-
cycle of the family and farm type.  Other factors include capital gains
returns, tax management, farm succession planning, psychological rewards,
Table 3-1—Share of hours worked in farming (by operator and spouse
combined) and share of earned household income from farming for par-
ticipating farms, by farm type, 2000
Participating farms' Farming share of  
share of: the household's:
Farm  type Operator Value Government Earned Work
households of pro- payments income1 hours
duction
Percent
Limited-resource 2 --a --a --b 61
Retirement 8 11 - - b 76
Residential 316 9 - - b 29
Farm occupation-low sales 28 10 14 --b 70
Farm occupation-high sales 18 21 27 38 77
Large 8 23 26 64 80
Very large 5 40 22 82 83
All family farms 100 100 100 20 59
a = Less than 1 percent.
b Negative farm income and positive total income (from both farm and earned off-farm sources).
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2000.16 Total payments in 1991 were
about the same level as in 1996 ($8.2
billion).  In 1996, the $5.9 billion in
PFC payments were comparable to
$5.9 billion in coupled payments in
1991, and conservation payments were
relatively constant across the years.
By 1999 and 2000, PFC payments and
conservation payments were about the
same as in 1996, but loan deficiency
payments and emergency assistance
resulted in total payments of just
above $20 billion.  
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and expectations about future program eligibility (see box, “Factors Other
Than Current Income Affecting Farm Labor Choices”).  Similarly in consid-
ering off-farm work, health insurance benefits are often a factor in a worker’s
off-farm employment choices (Jensen and Salant, 1986).
Do Farm Households Adjust Labor in 
Response to Government Payments?
Having reviewed some commonly held theories regarding income and labor,
we now examine farm household responses to coupled and decoupled
payments.   USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey tracked
labor supply responses to coupled payments as well as PFC payments
during the 1990s.  These data can be used to demonstrate the impact of
government payments on labor hours on and off the farm during periods
(1991, 1996, and 2000) when different types of policies were in place (see
Westcott and Young, chapter 1).16 This descriptive analysis is supplemented
by three separate statistical analyses that isolate the effects of coupled and
PFC payments on labor allocations.  
 Households’ onfarm hours changed little during the 1990s. The 
level of payments, as well as how they were distributed, varied in 
many ways across the time period, but farm operators and spouses
receiving commodity payments maintained consistent farm work sched-
ules during 1991-2000.  ARMS data show very little difference for either
operators or spouses in farm time allocations between 1991 and 2000
(fig. 3-1).  
Descriptive analysis is a first step in determining the impacts of payments
on labor allocations, but more advanced statistical analysis can control for
other variables that may affect these decisions. Using 2001 data, El-Osta et
al. (2004) analyzed the separate effects of three payments (PFC, disaster,
and coupled loan deficiency payments) on farm, off-farm, and total hours










Average farm hours worked per week by program commodity
participants 
Source:  1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey; 1996 and 2000 Agricultural Resource
Management Survey.
Note:  Differences across years are not statistically significant
Hours29
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Factors Other Than Current Income Affecting 
Farm Labor Choices 
Capital gains. Some farmers may own and operate their farms in anticipation
of capital gains from increasing land values.  Other farmers may be largely
retired but maintain the farm to minimize capital gains taxes from selling or
transferring the farm prior to death (Harrington, 1983; Davenport et al., 1982). 
Current income tax management. Farm losses can be used to offset income
tax liability on nonfarm income.  This tax advantage could outweigh the
incentive to leave farming for farms that have net income losses (Davenport et
al., 1982).
Farm succession. Farmers intending to pass the farm onto future generations
may place a value on this option in addition to current-year returns.  Farmers
surveyed in 1988 were twice as likely to state they intend to bequeath their
farm as to sell it (Whittaker and Ahearn, 1991). 
Psychological rewards. Farmers likely get satisfaction from farming beyond
monetary returns.  This presumed psychological  dividend is often offered as
an explanation for why farmers choose to stay on the farm despite low, and
even negative, profits. 
Expectations that current farm operation may affect future program eligibility.
Farmland owners may expect that future rules of eligibility to receive payments
may be conditional on how they operate their farms in the current period.  Some
farmers may perceive that producing traditional program commodities, even if
the payments are decoupled from current year production decisions, may main-
tain or increase their eligibility for future payments. A 2002 ARMS survey of
farmers at the close of the FAIR Act found a great deal of diversity in their
expectations about government support under a future farm bill. 
Farmer expectations at the end of the FAIR Act about prices 
and government support under a future farm bill.
Survey question                                                Share responding1
Do you expect to receive about the same level of 
government support for this operation during                Percent





Do you expect government support regardless 
of price developments during the next 4 years?
Yes 65
No 35
During the next 4 years, do you expect the general 
trend in the prices of the commodities you produce to be—
About the same 65
Decline 16
Increase1 9
1 Excludes respondents who refused. Refusals varied from 2-6 percent of respondents.30
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payments.17 Moreover, they provided two treatments for payments, one that
treated the decision to participate in programs as endogenous and the other
as exogenous.  All government payments combined had a positive impact on
the hours that operators worked on the farm.  When payments were modeled
separately, PFC payments still had a weakly significant and small positive
impact on operator’s farm hours worked. For the average recipient who
received just over $9,000 per year in 2001, the estimates suggest they might
increase total work hours by about 1 workweek per year. 
In another study using pooled 1998-2000 data, Dewbre and Mishra (2002)
found that PFC payments did not have a statistically significant impact on
farm hours worked for those payment recipients who allocated hours to both
farm and off-farm work.  Their analysis is not directly comparable to El-
Osta et al. in research design.  Dewbre and Mishra rexcluded retirement and
residential/lifestyle farms and controlled only for farm size and receipt of
other nonlabor income. (Dewbre and Mishra did not report an analysis of
the impact of PFC payments on farm labor for the group that did not work
off the farm.)
The modest labor response to decoupled payments reported by Dewbre and
Mishra is consistent with similar findings in nonfarm labor markets. For
example, the labor allocation model has been applied to labor supply deci-
sions of lottery winners.  Imbens et al. (2001) found that lottery winners
who won an average of $80,000 per year (for 20 consecutive years) reduced
their labor supply between 4.1 and 9.3 hours per week (from a base of 37.5
hours per week).  However, small lottery winners, receiving annual
payments of $15,000 or less, did not significantly alter their supply of labor.
While the conditions in which PFC payments are given differ in important
ways from lottery winnings, the example illustrates the relatively minor
impacts on labor decisions to be expected from small, unconditional income
transfers.  Since lottery winners reduce work and increase leisure, while
PFC recipients increase work on the farm, there are likely benefits of farm
work or aspects of farm labor markets that differ from nonfarm.
 Work off the farm increased during the 1990s; still, coupled and
decoupled payments helped reduce off-farm work hours.  ARMS data
show a pronounced increase in off-farm work in the latter half of the
1990s (fig. 3-2).  To augment this simple comparison of hours worked in
different years, we describe estimates of a labor supply function that
controls for dynamic variables that also may affect off-farm work hours,
such as local labor conditions.
El-Osta et al. (2004), with an off-farm labor supply model using 2001 data,
found that all payments combined—and PFC payments individually—had a
negative impact on off-farm work.  Ahearn et al. (2002) reached a similar
conclusion using a model with operators who participated in government
programs during 3 years in the 1990s.  Ahearn et al. found no difference in
the effect of payments on off-farm labor supply between 1991 and 1996
when coupled payments declined and PFC payments were introduced.
Payments had a weaker negative effect on off-farm labor supply in 1999,
when payments were a mixture of coupled and PFC payments. The smaller
impact in 1999 was due to the significantly greater transfers in that year,
rather than a difference in the impact of the different payment types. These
17 Specifying the sample to be only
those farms that received all three
types of payments provided the most
stringent statistical test.  When the
analysis was performed with a larger
sample for farms that received any of
the three categories of payments, the
statistical significance of the relation-
ships between payments and hours was
even stronger.31
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analyses reinforce previous studies showing that coupled government
payments decrease the likelihood of farm operators working off the farm
(El-Osta and Ahearn, 1996; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997).
Given the consistency across studies, we conclude that the statistically
significant increases in off-farm work of farm operators from 1996 to 2000
may have been even greater had payments not been so high.  This conclu-
sion holds for both coupled and decoupled payments.18 
 Operators of large farms providing the bulk of output continue to work
more than 40 hours per week on their farm. Of those farms that
receive payments, more than 80 percent of production comes from the
largest 30 percent of farms.  Almost all of the operators of these farms
are only employed on their farms.  For example, in 2000, operators of
the largest farms worked about 60 hours per week on their farms, and
very little, on average, off their farms.  This is consistent with the labor
allocations of large farms in years prior to the 1996 Act. 
Conclusions
The impact of decoupled payments—versus coupled payments—on farm
labor and agricultural supply, compared to a scenario with no program
payments, is much more complex than can be portrayed by the simple,
shortrun models of labor allocation presented here.  Still, we found that both
decoupled and coupled payments help to decrease off-farm work hours. We
also found that the introduction of lump-sum payments after the 1996 Farm
Act seems to have encouraged farm households to devote slightly more
hours to farm work.  
The labor allocations of farm families are intertwined with their goals and
decisions about managing farming operations now and into the future. If
farm families adjust their work little or not at all in response to decoupled










Average off-farm hours worked per week by program participants 
Source:  1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey; 1996 and 2000  Agricultural Resource
Management Surveys. 
 
Note:  For the operator and spouse, the 1991-96 change was not statistically significant;
the 1996-2000 change was statistically significant.
Hours
18 This is consistent with Dewbre
and Mishra (2002) who found, for
households that worked on and off
farm, PFC payments did not affect
their farm hours but did reduce the
total hours they worked.  That is, PFC
payments likely induced farm house-
holds to work less off their farm in
the late 1990s than they would have
otherwise.32
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program eligibility.  In addition, farm families may be limited in how they
apportion their labor: farm work is highly seasonal and off-farm jobs are
often inflexible in their time requirements.  Life-cycle considerations influ-
ence labor choices, too. Perhaps most important, large commercial farms
provide the bulk of U.S. output. The introduction of decoupled payments did
little to alter the allocation of labor on these farms, where operators typically
devote 60 hours per week (full-time) to farm work.  
What is the impact on overall farm production?  The potential effects of
labor shifts on supply depend in part on the amount of labor used in produc-
tion, and this varies across farm sectors (see box, “Family and Hired Labor
on Farms Receiving Government Payments”).  Also, if decoupled payments
led to changes in hours worked by farm households, hired labor could adjust
to maintain production levels—if rural labor markets are functioning well.
Other material inputs may also substitute for labor, offsetting any impacts on
production levels from changes in household work hours.  Production effects,
therefore, can be expected to be proportionately smaller than any changes in
labor inputs in response to coupled or decoupled payments. 
Family and Hired Labor on Farms Receiving
Government Payments
Farm operators and their families supply, in aggregate, about two-thirds of the
labor hours worked on U.S. farms, but labor shares vary considerably by
participation in government programs and commodity specialization. 
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When decoupled payments were enacted in 1996, some identified ways that
decoupled payments might indirectly influence production decisions
(Hennessy, 1998; Tielu and Roberts, 1998; and Antón, 2000).  Such indirect
links include easing farmers’ credit constraints, raising farmers’ wealth and
thus their tolerance for risk, instilling expectations of future payments, and
affecting farmers’ labor-leisure decisions.  In this chapter, we are concerned
primarily with farmers’ wealth, risk attitudes, and production decisions.
Decoupled payments increase producers’ wealth, and this enhanced wealth,
in turn, could increase their tolerance to risk.  This willingness to assume
more risk could lead to shifts toward more acreage for riskier crops or
changes in use of risk-reducing (or increasing) inputs, leading to changes in
total plantings.  If such decisions at the farm level are significant, aggregate
U.S. production could change, which could affect world markets.
Decoupled Payments and U. S. Farmer 
Income and Wealth
The size of decoupled payments since 1996 raises the question of whether
they might still induce additional production indirectly.  Specifically, do
farmers’ income and wealth increase to the point where they become willing
to assume more risk and alter their production decisions?19
Like other government payments, decoupled payments represent an imme-
diate supplement to farm household income and can be used for current
needs, including paying for farm expenses and meeting family living costs.
Decoupled payments also affect farm household wealth – the value of assets
less liabilities – when they are used for purposes such as reducing debt,
investing in the farm, or nonfarm investments.  For landowners, decoupled
payments also influence wealth by increasing farmland values.  The value of
agricultural land should largely reflect its current and future earnings poten-
tial.  Because PFCs become a part of returns to farmland, they become capi-
talized into its price, changing the wealth of land-owners.  Using a dynamic
model, Roe et al. (chapter 2) estimated that PFC payments increased aggre-
gate land values by about 8 percent. Goodwin et al. (2003a, 2003b) found
that decoupled payments have increased land values, ranging anywhere
from 2 to 6 percent in the Northern Great Plains and Corn Belt regions.
Barnard et al. (2001) found that the gap between aggregate land values with
and without government payments was about 13 percent during 1990-97,
increasing to about 25 percent during 1998-2001 when payments included
MLA and marketing loan benefits in addition to PFC payments.  Note that
farmers who buy land after the payments have already been capitalized into
19 The remaining discussion will
focus on payments having characteris-
tics similar to the PFC payments and
not the Market Loss Assistance emer-
gency payments made in 1998 to 2001.
Also, we do not address the issue of
updating and expectations related to
the direct payments created under the
2002 FSRI Act.34
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the land price do not benefit, since the capitalized value of the payments
was, in effect, paid to the previous owner.
However, not all PFC payments benefit farm operators since not all farm-
land is owned by operators.  Tenant farmers may pass these payments
through to landlords through higher farmland rental payments and as a
result do not benefit from the entire direct payment or its capitalization into
land values.  An ERS report indicates that about 60 percent of the acreage
enrolled in the PFC program was rented in 1996 (USDA, ERS, 2003).
Roberts (chapter 6) reports a one-third pass-through rate from farmers to
landowners on cash-rented land in 1997.  These values suggest nonfarm
landlords received at least 20 percent of the payments (60 percent of land
times 33 percent pass-through rate).  After adjusting for payment pass-
through, Roberts estimates that the total (coupled plus decoupled) payments
in 1999 represented an average of 3 percent of overall farm household
wealth for households receiving payments.  Decoupled payments in 1999
accounted for 24 percent of total direct payments to these farm households.  
Risk and Risk Management in Farming
Does greater wealth make producers more willing to accept risk in their
production decisions?  Risk is a fundamental component of the farm busi-
ness and farm household, and it influences production choices and farm
management decisions.  The many sources of risk in agriculture range from
price and yield risk to income/financial risk to personal injury/health risk
(Harwood et al., 1999).  Farmers who have borrowed money are at risk of
default if income falls short.  Because prices, yield, and other outcomes are
contingent on markets and weather, the consequences of production deci-
sions are not known until long after those decisions are made.  
Several surveys have asked farmers to rank the risks they confront.  The
1996 ARMS data indicate that producers of field crops—such as wheat,
corn, soybean, tobacco, and cotton—were concerned more about yield and
price variability than about other categories of risk, while producers of
vegetables, greenhouse crops, cattle, and poultry were most concerned about
changes in government laws and regulations.  Across all farms, ARMS data
clearly indicate that producers are most concerned about changes in govern-
ment laws and regulations (institutional risk), variability in crop yields or
livestock output (production risk), and uncertainty in commodity prices
(market risk) (Harwood et al., 1999).  Concerns about risk also vary across
types of producers and by farm type and size groupings (Musser and
Patrick, 2002).
Farmers generally use a combination of risk management tools to mitigate
risk.  Risk management strategies include diversification, production
contracting, maintaining liquid assets, and crop insurance.  In crop produc-
tion, farmers may reduce risk by using more drought-tolerant varieties,
varying tillage practices, or irrigating if possible.  To transfer the risk of
falling crop prices, farmers may use forward contracting, futures, or options.
Government payments also provide support during periods of low
commodity prices and in the event of natural disasters.20 Basis risk is the risk that the pro-
ducer’s local cash price does not track
perfectly with the price of the hedging
instrument, such as a futures contract.
35
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The farming household has additional means for coping with risk.  Off-farm
employment is a significant source of income for many farm households,
and this source is usually more stable than farm income.  Most farmers have
some life insurance, health insurance, and insurance on major property such
as their home, automobiles, and farm equipment.  Investments can be
shifted between farming and nonfarming uses.  Household consumption
may be tightened if income drops.
Even so, all of these strategies do not completely mitigate the risk of low
incomes.  For example, farmers with crop insurance must still absorb the
deductibles, and price-hedging strategies often maintain some basis risk.20
Government emergency payments usually do not cover all yield shortfalls.
Even off-farm employment may be uncertain.  So farming decisions will
always be made in the face of at least some risk.  Consequently, under-
standing farmers’ attitudes toward risk is critical to ascertain how they may
make use of decoupled payments.
Farmers’ Attitudes Toward Risk
Farmers allocate their assets and engage in production activities to maxi-
mize the utility of their income or wealth, rather than to simply maximize
expected profits (see box, “Measures of Risk Aversion”).  This implies that
farmers use decision rules that account for not only expected profits but also
the risks associated with their production and management decisions.  When
a decisionmaker prefers a particular amount of income generated with
certainty from an economic activity or adoption of technology over an alter-
native that, on average, provides the same expected return but also has
uncertainty in its outcome, the individual is said to be risk averse.  A risk-
averse person still prefers more income to less, but would be willing to give
up some income in exchange for a more stable stream, while a risk-neutral
person is interested only in expected or average profits and would not be
dissuaded by any uncertainties in prices or output.  The trade-off may
depend on the level of wealth.
An individual’s preference now and into the future for a certain outcome
over an uncertain one with equal expected value can be measured by the
risk aversion coefficient.  Empirical studies have generally found evidence
of risk aversion for most U.S. farmers, but with a wide range of risk atti-
tudes (table 4-1). These studies date back 30 years and have examined the
risk attitudes of many groups of farmers by using a variety of approaches to
measure these attitudes.21
Some studies have examined whether the agricultural sector as a whole
exhibits risk-averse behavior.  In studies of the U.S. corn and soybean
sectors, Chavas and Holt (1990 and 1996) found evidence of risk aversion
as well as decreasing aversion to risk as wealth increases.  Lence (2000)
found mild risk aversion for the U.S. agricultural sector but also found that
relative risk aversion among U.S. farmers appeared to decrease over time
since the mid-1930s. 
Just and Pope (2002) summarized research on risk preferences as generally
supporting the “stylized fact” that utility (see box, “Measures of Risk Aver-
sion”) is increasing at a decreasing rate with wealth and profit; that is,
21 Young (1979) categorizes these
methods as direct elicitation of utility
functions (DEU), experimental meth-
ods (EM), and observed economic
behavior (OEB).  The DEU process
consists of interviewing farmers to
determine their preferences among
risky alternatives for hypothetical gains
and losses.  The EM process consists
of presenting farmers with real risky
prospects (that is, significant monetary
payoffs instead of simply hypothetical
choices) and observing their decisions.
The OEB method consists of estimat-
ing risk attitude parameters reflected in
observed farming decisions, such as
input levels and crop acreage mix.36
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Table 4-1--Risk attitudes of U.S. farmers:R e sults of empirical studies 
Source Description of  Measurement method1 Sample size Risk attitudes Effect of wealth
producers
Bard and Barry Illinois farmers DEU-interval method 81 farmers >50 percent averse Not  evaluated
Brink and McCarl Midwest grain   OEB-compared profit   38 farmers 66 percent averse, Not  evaluated
farmers max. vs. utility max. in 34 percent neutral,
QP model 0 percent loving
Chavas and U.S. corn and OEB-model  based on  Aggregate-used Averse Decreases 
Holt, 1990 soybean sectorsa creage allocations national dataa version
Chavas and U.S. corn and  OEB - model based on  Aggregate-used Averse Decreases 
Holt, 1996 soybean sectorsa creage allocation national data  aversion
Collins, Musser, Oregon  grass DEU-estimated utility  37 farmers 16-32 percent averse Not evaluated
and Mason seed growers functions3 8 -52 percent 
neutral, 30-32  
percent loving
Halter and Oregon  grass   DEU-estimated utility 44  farmers About equal Not  evaluated
Mason seed growers functionsa cross averse, 
neutral, loving
Hildreth and Minnesota cattle DEU-estimated 13 farmers8 5 percent to 8 Generally
Knowles producers various utility functions percent averse, decreases 
varies by  aversion
functional form;
King and Eastern Colorado  DEU - interval   10 farmers3 0 percent No clear
Oamek wheat farmersa pproach averse, relationship
70 percent mixed
Lence U.S. agricultural OEB-model  based Aggregate-used Averse Not evaluated
sector on  asset allocations national data
Lin, Dean, California crop  OEB-compared utility 6 farmers 50 percent  Not evaluated
and Moore farmers max and profit max  averse,
33 percent neutral,
17 percent mixed
Love and Iowa corn and OEB-estimated using 264  farmers in 3 Averse for all No change
Buccolas oybean farmers FOC for input choices counties-data  3 counties (imposed by
in utility max model aggregated by functional form)
county
Ramaratnam,   Texas grain DEU-estimated various 26  farmers 100 percent to Varies by func-
Rister, Bessler, sorghum farmersu tility functions 73 percent averse, tional form
and Novak varies by functional
form;
Saha, Shumway, Kansas wheat OEB-estimated using 15 farmers Averse Decreases 
and Talpazf armers FOC for input choices (observations  aversion
in utility max model aggregated)
Schurle and Kansas crop and DEU-interval method 90 farmers8 0 percent Not evaluated
Tierney livestock farmersa verse,
2 percent neutral,
18 percent loving 
Tauer New York dairy  DEU - interval method 72 farmers3 4 percent averse, Group test:
farmers3 9 percent neutral, decreases
26 percent loving aversion
Thomas Kansas crop and  DEU - interval method 30 farmers 20 percent averse, Generally 
livestock farmers 13 percent loving, decreases 
67 percent mixed aversion
Wilson and Minnesota swine  DEU - interval method 45 farmers 42 percent averse, 33 percent decreases, 
Eidman producers3 6 percent neutral, 21 percent constant,
22 percent loving 18 percent increases,
28 percent mixed
1DEU = direct elicitation of utility, OEB = observed economic behavior, FOC = first order conditions, and QP = quadratic programming.37
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Measures of Risk Aversion
Economists have theorized that individuals use decision rules that account for not only expected profits but also the risks
associated with their management decisions.  That is, individuals allocate their assets and engage in production activities
that maximize the “utility” of their income or wealth, rather than simply maximize expected profits.  “Utility” in this sense
accounts not only for the mean or average level of income or wealth but also for its variability or riskiness.
A decisionmaker is said to be “risk averse” when he or she prefers a particular amount of income received with certainty
over an alternative that, on average, provides the same expected return but also has uncertainty in its outcomes.  Put
another way, a risk-averse person still prefers more income to less, but prefers less variability over greater variability.  A
more risk-averse person is willing to accept a smaller income with certainty, relative to the expected value of the risky
prospect.  A person who cares only about expected profit and is indifferent to its variability is said to be “risk neutral,”
while a person who prefers more variability for a given level of expected profits is said to be “risk loving.”
Risk aversion is indicated by a utility function that shows decreasing marginal utility as the level of income or wealth (w) is
increased. Indifference to risk is represented by a linear utility function.  More formally, risk attitude is defined by the second
derivative of the utility function: U† (w) < 0 implies risk aversion, U† (w) = 0 implies risk indifference or neutrality, and U† (w)
> 0 implies risk preference.
An individual’s preference for a certain outcome over an uncertain outcome with equal expected value is measured by the
risk aversion coefficient, and this measure is suitable for comparisons across individuals or comparisons across income or
wealth levels for a single decisionmaker.
The degree of risk aversion is measured by coefficient of absolute risk aversion, coefficient of relative risk aversion, and
coefficient of partial (relative) risk aversion.  The “coefficient of absolute risk aversion” is defined as:  r a = - U† (w)/
U† (w); while the “coefficient of relative risk aversion” is defined as:  r r = - w U† (w)/U† (w).  A third measure of risk aver-
sion is the “coefficient of partial (relative) risk aversion,” defined as:  r p = -x U† (x)/U† (x), where x is gain or loss or oper-
ating income.  Partial risk aversion is the same as relative risk aversion, except that it is defined in terms of loss or gain,
rather than wealth (Robison and Barry, 1987; Newberry and Stiglitz, 1981).
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) implies that the preferred option in a risky choice situation is unaffected by
the addition or subtraction of a constant amount to all payoffs.  In other words, a person whose aversion to a particular
level of risk is not affected by their level of wealth is said to display CARA.  A negative exponential utility function such
as U = 1-exp(-cW) exhibits CARA property.  r a = c for this utility function.  CARA is not a desirable property because it
fails to represent rational decisionmaking.  Most empirical studies in agricultural economics reject the assumption of
CARA (Pope and Just, 1991; Chavas and Holt, 1996).
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) implies that an individual becomes more willing to accept a particular risk
as his or her wealth increases.  A log utility function such as U = ln(w) exhibits DARA property.  r a = 1/w, implying that
an individual becomes less risk averse as his or her wealth increases.  Chavas and Holt, 1996 and Saha et al. 1994, found
agricultural decision maker preferences to be consistent with DARA.
Economists have theorized that most people probably become less averse to a particular level of risk as their wealth
increases and, in this case, are said to display DARA.  In a sense, a person with a million dollars would be less averse to a
gamble with some probability of losing $100 than if this person had only $2,000 to start with.
Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA) implies that an individual is less willing to accept a particular level of risk as
his or her wealth increases.  A quadratic utility function such as:  U = w - bw2 exhibits IARA property.  r a = 2b/(1-2bw)2
suggests that an individual becomes more risk averse as his or her wealth increases.  Since IARA implies rarely observed
response to risk, quadratic utility function is not generally assumed in the literature.
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) implies that the preferred option among a set of risky alternatives would not
be changed if all payoffs were multiplied by a constant amount.  That is, an individual will have constant aversion to a
proportional loss of wealth even though the absolute loss increases.  A special form of the power utility function such as U
= {1/(1-r)}W(1-r) exhibits CRRA property.  r r = r for this utility function.  CRRA is implicit in many risk analyses in which
calculations are on a per-acre basis.  CRRA is inappropriate for risk analysis in agriculture because farmers with different
farm sizes are known to react differently to risky alternatives.
In sum, with CRRA, a person feels the same about losing 10 percent of $100 and losing 10 percent of $1,000.  With
increasing RRA (IRRA), a person is more averse to losing 10 percent of $1,000 than to losing 10 percent of $100, while
with decreasing RRA (DRRA) a person is more averse to losing 10 percent of $100 than to losing 10 percent of $1,000.38
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producers are generally risk averse.  But they also found decreasing absolute
risk aversion to be common among producers, implying that as producers
become wealthier over time they have more tolerance for risk.  Although
farmers who receive PFC payments likely display varying attitudes toward
risk, it is certainly plausible that some such farmers are willing to assume
more risk.
Decoupled Payments and Production Decisions
Decoupled payments may influence farmers’ production decisions if
changes in wealth alter their attitude toward risk.  A farmer’s level of risk
aversion may affect production decisions and management choices in
several ways.  The most obvious is the mix of farm outputs.  Like an
investor trying to balance risk and returns in a securities portfolio, a
producer may adjust the acreage mix of crops to reflect some tradeoff
between risk and returns.  Compared with a more risk-averse farmer, a less
risk-averse farmer would plant more land to a riskier crop or plant on
marginal land if it enabled greater returns (Hardaker et al.).
Aversion to risk may also affect total output and input use.  A more risk-
averse producer, who dislikes income variability, may prefer slightly lower
output and expected returns if variability of returns also declines (Sandmo,
1971).  So if decoupled payments raise farmers’ wealth and their tolerance
for risk, they may take on more risk in their production choices in pursuit of
higher returns.  Risk aversion could also affect input decisions to the extent
that the level of input use affects output variability.  Other things equal, a
risk-averse producer would prefer to use less of an input (such as fertilizers
for corn production) that increases output variability, compared to input use
for expected profit maximization (MacMinn and Holtman, 1983).
As mentioned, some have argued that decoupled payments encourage
producers to increase their production and alter cropping patterns, with
unintended aggregate effects.  Many theoretical studies have described these
possible links.  For example, Tielu and Roberts (1998) examined how
decoupled payments may boost production by increasing farm investment
(increasing wealth and lowering risk), reducing farm exits (by raising land
values), and increasing output in the long run (by creating expectations of
future payments).  They argued that the wealth and risk effects of decoupled
payments on production are likely minimal.  
Only a few empirical studies have examined the actual magnitude of such
effects on crop production; these are simulations of the payments that
suggest that decoupled payments have little effect on U.S. acreage allocation
and production.  Young and Westcott (2000) applied the acreage elasticities
with respect to wealth from Chavas and Holt (1990) to U.S. crops receiving
PFC payments.  Because PFC payments are small (3 percent of total farm
wealth) and because the impact of wealth on acreage is also small,Young
and Westcott conclude that acreage shifts from PFC payments would be
minimal.22 Assuming that farmers receive the full value of PFC payments,
the estimated acreage shift for the seven crops covered by PFC payments
would range from 180,000 to 570,000 acres annually, on a base of about
22 This elasticity shows the percent-
age change in crop acreage in response
to a 1-percent change in farm wealth.39
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180 million acres.  Accounting for the pass-through of PFC payments to
nonfarming landlords would reduce this effect even further.
Burfisher et al. (2000) used a computable general equilibrium model of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico to show the effects of decoupled
payments on agricultural production, prices, and trade.  They incorporated
risk premiums reflecting the variability of net returns for four major crops
into their model.  Here, risk premiums work like a tax or added cost,
resulting in lower overall production.  By reducing risk premiums, decou-
pled payments lead to higher production.  Their model suggests that a 50-
percent increase in decoupled payments would boost U.S. crop production
slightly, ranging from 0.5 percent for wheat to 1.1 percent for oilseeds.
Burfisher et al. used a relative risk aversion coefficient of 2.0 for the U.S.;
using Lence’s (2000) value of 1.13 would reduce the risk premiums by
roughly half, resulting in an even smaller acreage shift.
Conclusions
The effects of decoupled payments have become prominent as governments
consider how to fulfill their WTO obligations to limit payments that influ-
ence production, prices, and trade.  The notion that decoupled payments
might influence production through “risk effects” presumes that such
payments increase farmers’ income and wealth such that they become less
risk averse.  This change in attitude could then be manifested through
changes in input use, a new output mix, and changes in overall production. 
The effects of payments on risk attitudes and production are likely small for
several reasons.  While many farmers are likely to alter their response to
risk as they become wealthier, decoupled payments are small compared with
participating farmers’ net wealth—after adjusting for pass-through to
nonfarming landowners.  More important, while empirical studies of
farmers’ risk attitudes indicate some evidence of risk aversion, producers do
not respond to risk solely through adjustments to production or inputs.
Surveys find that producers already use various tools—such as insurance,
hedging, and management strategies—to mitigate risks.  And, farm house-
holds can respond to changes in their risk attitudes with adjustments
throughout their portfolio, such as off-farm employment and investing in
nonfarm real estate or financial assets. 40




Farmers, Capital Markets, 
and Supply Effects
Robert N. Collender and Mitchell Morehart
Are there distortions in farm capital markets that prevent U.S. farmers from
making profitable investments?  In other words, is U.S. farm production
constrained by imperfect access to capital?  If so, decoupled payments could
mitigate these capital market imperfections both by increasing internal funds
and by expanding access to market credit.  This, in turn, could induce more
onfarm investment and production.  On the other hand, if farmers are not
forgoing profitable capital investments, then decoupled payments will not
substantially change production through this mechanism.
Capital Markets’ Role in Agricultural
Production
Understanding the linkages between capital markets and agricultural
production is essential to understanding whether decoupled payments are
likely to induce increases in farm investment and production.  However,
before considering the relationship between capital markets and production,
it is useful to distinguish between real and financial capital.  Real farm
capital consists of physical assets such as buildings, machinery/equipment,
and breeding stock.  The term “real” capital is usually reserved for assets
whose usefulness extends over several production cycles. (Although land—
see chapter 6—is a physical asset used over multiple production cycles, by
convention it is excluded from real capital.)  Financial capital represents the
means by which ownership or control of real assets is acquired, and owner-
ship can be financed in two ways.  Equity capital represents a direct owner-
ship claim financed through the assets of the owner, while debt capital
represents an ownership claim financed by a lender.  Leases are another
important source of financial capital in U.S. agriculture.  Leases and
contract production arrangements do not represent an ownership claim but a
right to use assets under specified conditions.  
The importance and composition of physical assets vary substantially
across farm types and regions, as shown by the 2000 ARMS data (table 5-
1).  Physical assets make up 80 percent of the value of total assets on
commercial farms, versus 95 percent for rural residence farms.23 Land is
usually the dominant physical asset, except for poultry where farm build-
ings account for 41 percent of total assets.  Farm equipment is a strong
contributor to total assets for cash grain and hog operations.  The compo-
sition of assets also varies greatly by region.  Land ranges from 40 percent
of total assets in the Northern Crescent to 60 percent in the Basin and
Range region.24
23 The farm typology groups farms
into three groups: commercial farms
(all farms with greater than $250,000
in sales), intermediate farms (opera-
tor’s primary occupation is farming,
with sales less than $250,000 per year)
and rural residence farms (operator is
retired, their main occupation is not
farming, or has limited economic
resources).
24 Definitions of ERS regions are
described at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/aib760.41
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Farmers’ aggregate access to real capital can influence the supply of agricul-
tural products to the market.  Special-purpose buildings, breeding stock, and
machinery and equipment are all costly and critical to agricultural produc-
tion.  Such physical assets may enable farmers to adopt new production
technologies that further enhance productivity. 
Farmers’ access to financial capital can directly affect their access to real
capital.  Without efficient financial capital markets, farmers might delay
adopting more efficient technologies as they become available.  Agricultural
capital markets also allow farmers to pursue profitable investment opportu-
nities without having to save the necessary funds or sacrifice their own
current standard of living.  As such, financial markets enable the movement
of purchasing power and productive assets to those who can use them most
profitably.  This accelerates efficiency gains in agricultural production and
farm management, and thus improves overall agricultural productivity.
Table 5-1—Importance and composition of physical assets in total farm business assets by farm type and
region
Share of phsical assets total farm business assets
Total
Item                                                      Land            Operator's            Other            Farm            Breeding           physical
dwelling            buildings      equipment        animals             assets
Percent
All farms 48 13 13 11 4 89
Commodity program participants 49 9 10 15 5 88
Nonparticipants 47 17 15 8 49 1
Farm typology (collapsed):
Commercial farms 433 16 13 5 80
Intermediate farms 49 13 11 12 4 89
Rural residence farms 50 22 11 9 3 95
Production specialty:
Cash grain 50 9 7 18 1 85
General field crops 53 15 10 11 1 90
Fruits, vegetables, and nursery crops3 97 2 6 8 0 80
Beef cattle 54 15 9 8 69 2
Hogs3 41 12 2 1 4 38 4
Poultry 25 13 41 12 2 93
Dairy 356 1 7 1 3 188 9
General livest o c k 4 22 71 2 8 49 3
Resource region:
Heartland 48 12 10 14 2 86
Northern Crescent 40 18 17 12 5 92
Northern Great Plains 50 6 7 138 8 4
Prairie Gateway5 1 1 2 9 1 2 5 89
Eastern Uplands 48 18 12 11 5 94
Southern Seaboard 50 15 13 10 3 91
Fruitful Rim 44 12 18 7 38 4
Basin and Range 60 9 9 7 5 90
Mississippi Portal5 0 1 5 7 1 83 93
Source: 2000 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, USDA.42
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Decoupled Payments in an
Imperfect Capital Market 
Most farmers do not have access to outside equity investors, and so must
rely on their own financial resources or on leases, contract arrangements, or
borrowed funds for liquidity and capital investment.  This reliance is essen-
tial to any potential link between decoupled payments and increased produc-
tion through imperfect capital markets.  
If farmers are operating to maximize profits and face efficient capital
markets, farm investment decisions are based on a comparison of the
expected rates of return from onfarm and off-farm investments.  Farm
investment occurs until expected returns on additional investments are no
longer as great as those available from off-farm opportunities.  Lump-sum
decoupled payments do not directly affect either onfarm or off-farm rates of
return.  Instead, they provide farm households with increased purchasing
power to allocate among a variety of uses, including both investment and
consumption.  In this case, decoupled payments would not affect onfarm
investment or production levels through capital market channels.
However, financial capital markets are generally characterized by imperfec-
tions including asymmetric information and adverse incentives.  (Transac-
tions costs and imperfect competition can also cause capital market
imperfections, but they are outside the scope of this chapter.)  Asymmetric
information is when outside sources of capital (lenders, partners, and share-
holders) have less information than farm managers about how the capital
will be used.  In turn, asymmetric information enables farm managers to
understate the riskiness and overstate the expected profitability of their
investment opportunities to outside investors in order to reduce financing
costs and increase profits.  This combination of incomplete, asymmetric
information and adverse incentives can induce outside investors and credi-
tors to ration capital or credit and impose monitoring costs on a farm.  
Credit rationing occurs when lenders refuse to fully fund loans to borrowers
who meet their credit standards, even if borrowers offer to pay higher
interest rates.  Credit rationing occurs because lenders know that the higher
the interest rate, the more likely that willing borrowers will be to undertake
riskier investments and to understate investment risks, increasing the proba-
bility of default and lowering the expected return on the loan.  That is,
increasing interest rates are associated with greater adverse selection prob-
lems for lenders.  Redlining is an extreme form of credit rationing that
entails refusing to lend in certain areas or to certain types of businesses, and
may affect farmers during periods of low income, falling land values, or
restrictive monetary policy.  Restrictive monetary policy may lead to credit
crunches, wherein lenders have insufficient reserves to expand or even
maintain their credit portfolios. 
As a result of such lender responses, some agricultural producers may face
credit constraints that prevent them from maximizing their profits from
farming in a given production period.  In other words, a credit constraint
exists when the farm qualifies for credit under conventional underwriting
standards but is unable to find a willing lender.43
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Capital market imperfections may result in a variety of constraints on farm
production.  A liquidity constraint exists when a farm is unable to pursue its
most profitable production plan because it lacks the shortrun ability to pay
for inputs such as seed, fertilizer, or animal feed.  A capital constraint exists
when a farm is unable to pursue the most profitable production plan because
it lacks access to sufficient physical capital.  By this definition, a farm facing
a capital constraint could pay the competitive market price for additional
capital with the returns it would earn from additional capital investment. 
If farmers are unable to maximize profits because of capital market imper-
fections, decoupled payments could mitigate this problem and lead to
increases in investment and production.  Because the initial state was
distorted by market imperfections, these increases will tend to move the
sector toward greater economic efficiency.
Beyond the immediate addition to purchasing power provided by decoupled
payments, two other payment-related effects can increase farm creditworthi-
ness and reduce the likelihood of lenders rationing credit to farmers.  First,
decoupled payments improve access to credit by increasing the value of
farmers’ most important source of collateral, land (Barnard, 2001).  Since
the 1996 FAIR Act, decoupled payments have been linked to ownership of
specific cropland and do not require current production.  The direct link
between base acres and known program benefits allows sellers, purchasers,
and lenders to calculate payments’ value through capitalization—the same
process used to calculate the value of a bond, mortgage, or any other known
payment stream over time.  The capitalization of decoupled payments adds
to the value of land.   Second, to the extent that the payment stream can be
anticipated, lenders may allow farmers to pledge them as a source of repay-
ment capacity.  Both of these effects are important only with credit market
imperfections; if markets were perfect, lenders would readily fund all prof-
itable farm investments.
Farm Household Objectives Can Alter
the Effect of Decoupled Payments 
In addition to improving creditworthiness, decoupled payments may allow
marginally viable farm operations to remain in production and even to
increase the capital invested in their farms.  Farmers operating unprofitable
farms may have better off-farm investment opportunities with higher finan-
cial returns, but may accrue more personal rewards (both financial and
nonfinancial) by devoting the funds to farming.  
To the extent that decoupled payments allow these farmers to cover their
costs of production and family living expenses, they may reduce the aggre-
gate efficiency of production in the farm sector.  However, the effect on
overall farm production is ambiguous because some of the resources
controlled by these farmers would remain in the agricultural sector and be
used more efficiently (if such farms exited), while other resources would
exit the sector.  If farmland values increase because of decoupled payments,
farmers may be less likely to consider alternative uses of the land.  The
magnitude of any effect on production depends on the willingness of
marginally viable farmers to increase their investment in farming, how44
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responsive farm production is to new investment, and how fast farmers
invest in new real capital as their liquidity improves.  Aggregate effects for
each of these channels will also depend on the distribution of production
and productive assets across farmers with varying costs of capital, tax liabil-
ities, risk attitudes, and profit constraints.
Decoupled Payments and Capital Markets: 
The Literature 
The potential linkages from farm program payments through capital markets
to farm production are indirect and complex, making them difficult to
measure empirically.  Analyzing the relationships in a computable general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy, Roe et al. (chapter 2), find that in
the case of segmented or inefficient capital markets, direct payments have
limited shortrun and almost no longrun impacts on farm production relative
to a baseline case with no program payments.  An increase in land values
and rental rates were the main longrun impacts found.  
Other economic studies shed light on parts of this payments-capital-produc-
tion linkage, but were not designed to illuminate the entire chain of causa-
tion or to address the equilibrium impact of capital market imperfections on
the level of U.S. farm production or trade.  In general, each study illumi-
nates one of the following issues: how capital market imperfections affect
farm investment (Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992; Bierlen and Featherstone,
1998; Barry et al., 2000), the responsiveness of agricultural production to
new investment (Saha et al., 1994), or the speed with which farmers adjust
their stock of real productive capital as risk and other business conditions
change (Vasavada and Chambers, 1986; Halvorsen, 1991).  These studies
demonstrate how farm investment behavior has been dependent on farm
cash flows, but do not address decoupled payments since they predate the
program.  USDA’s ARMS data indicate little potential for decoupled
payments to affect agricultural production through increased investment
levels on farms that receive payments but are not currently cost-efficient
producers of program commodities. 
Studies linking capital market imperfections to farm investment
Studies have investigated the relationship between capital market imperfec-
tions and farm investment both for the sector in aggregate (Hubbard and
Kashyap) and for farms in particular States (Bierlen and Featherstone for
Kansas farms; Barry et al. for Illinois farms).  Using farm sector data from
1914 through 1987, Hubbard and Kashyap find that the rate of farm invest-
ment can be explained by rates of return during periods of high net worth.
But the level of internal reserves held by farmers determines the rate of
investment agriculture when the sector experiences declining net worth.
Their empirical tests indicate that a change in the value of collateral (prima-
rily farmland) is an important determinant of investment spending.  Thus,
the impact of capital market imperfections on aggregate investment patterns
in the U.S. agricultural sector has been statistically significant only during
periods of negative shocks to farm sector net worth, namely the sector reces-
sions of 1921-33 and 1981-86. 45
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Similarly, Bierlen and Featherstone tested for financial constraints in farm
machinery investment among commercial farms in Kansas from 1976 to
1992.  They find no evidence of financial constraints during the boom
period of the late 1970s, but some evidence of constraints during the 1980s
recession and the recovery of the 1990s.  The effect of cash flow on invest-
ment of those farmers most likely to be credit constrained – those with high
debt-to-asset ratios and younger operators – varied particularly with the
stage of the business cycle.  Thus, during the agricultural recession of the
1980s, the investment behavior of these farmers depended heavily on their
ability to generate internal funds.  Barry et al. also find that younger farmers
and those with lower credit scores in Illinois (1987-94) were more likely to
be affected by capital market imperfections.  That is, they relied more
heavily on current cash flows to fund investment.
So, during some farm recession periods, capital market imperfections are
associated with inefficiently low investment for some farms and for the
sector as a whole.  On the other hand, these studies do not find evidence that
investment is inefficiently high for farms with strong cash flow or for the
sector as a whole during periods of strong cash flow or high asset values.
These observations, in turn, imply decoupled payments may move farm
sector investment to more efficient levels in recession periods.
Studies of capital stock adjustment rate, and links between 
investment and production.  
Other studies address the linkage between investment and production.  Saha
et al. found that production increases by 0.2 to 0.25 percent for each 1-
percent increase in investment, depending on whether risk attitudes are
taken into account in modeling.  That is, production changes at one-fifth to
one-fourth the percentage rate that investment changes.  In addition, empir-
ical studies suggest that the rate of adjustment in capital stocks to economic
shocks is quite slow.  Halvorsen finds that capital inputs adjust to new equi-
librium values at rates ranging from a little over 1 year for durables to about
3 years for structures.  In contrast, Vasavada and Chambers find that aggre-
gate farm capital stock takes about 10 years to adjust.  Thus, investment
would have to increase by 4 to 5 percent to have a 1-percent impact on
sector output, and perhaps only if conditions prevailed for several years.
However, financial constraints are unlikely to have long-lasting effects on
sectoral investment and production since competitive pressures will, over
time, force financially constrained farms to sell assets to those who can
achieve higher returns. 
Evidence from 2000 ARMS data
If capital market imperfections exist, decoupled payments could affect the
investment decisions of participants.  Imperfections, such as a binding credit
constraint, would force farmers to deviate from their optimal financial struc-
ture by considering internal sources of funds or choosing to lease instead of
financing capital purchases with debt.  Additions to income from govern-
ment programs provide liquidity that can relax constraints associated with
imperfect capital markets.46
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Data correlating program participation, capital investment decisions, and
farm efficiency can illustrate how much capital market imperfections
impair agricultural investment.  Whittaker and Morehart (1991) found that
one in five Midwestern cash grain farms was unable to operate at minimum
cost during the 1980s due to debt and/or collateral constraints. Nasr et al.
(1998) showed that more efficient Illinois grain farms were more highly
leveraged.  The cause is ambiguous.  Lenders may expect grain farms with
greater leverage to “work harder” to meet debt repayment obligations, or
more efficient farmers may be viewed as more creditworthy and find
leverage more profitable.
If farmers faced substantial capital or credit constraints, one would expect
that higher cost farmers would be forced to invest less in machinery and
equipment over time. However, recent ARMS survey data for commodity
program participants fail to support the existence of a capital constraint
related to cost structure.  While high-cost soybean producers carry, on
average, a significantly lower debt-to-assets ratio than do other soybean
producers, this is not true for high-cost corn, cotton, or wheat producers
(fig. 5-1).25 Relative to low-cost producers, high-cost producers of
soybeans, corn, cotton, and wheat have, on average, equal or greater farm
assets, land, or buildings per acre farmed and investments in
machinery/equipment per acre farmed (fig. 5-2).  In addition, capital expen-
ditures per acre on high-cost farms, on average, equal or exceed those in
low cost farms (fig. 5-3).  Thus, there is little evidence that inefficient
producers of program commodities are inefficient because they lack phys-
ical capital.  This observation, in light of Saha et al., suggests that
increasing the capital investment of inefficient producers would not signifi-
cantly increase their production of program commodities.  Moreover, high-
cost producers account for much less production than their one-third
population share—ranging from 10 percent of total production for high-cost
soybean producers to 21 percent for high-cost wheat farms—so the modest
potential effect of decoupled payments on capital-induced production
becomes even more so.
25 We define high- (low-) cost farms
as the third of each farm type with the
highest (lowest) unit costs.47
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Figure 5-1
Except for soybean farms, high-cost farms, on average, have
debt/asset ratios that equal or exceed those of other farms
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On average, high-cost farms invest at least as much as low-cost 
farms in machinery per acre farmed
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Capital expenditures per acre of high-cost farms exceed that 
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Conclusions 
The Federal Government has been experimenting with payments to farmers
that are decoupled from current farm production in an attempt to reduce the
distortions in trade and resource allocation associated with coupled
payments.  This intended effect may be offset, however, if imperfections in
capital markets bind decoupled payments to farm production decisions.
Financial capital markets in agriculture are characterized by imperfections
relative to “efficient” markets, because lenders and borrowers have asym-
metric information. 
Though imperfections exist, they do not appear to influence aggregate
investment. Data do not indicate differences in capital investment or credit
use that would be likely if significant capital or credit constraints existed
among commodity program participants.  Investment per acre farmed is no
less for high-cost program participants than for low-cost participants and,
except for soybean growers, high-cost participants carry no less debt relative
to their assets.
The data are, however, limited.  Farms and farmers vary considerably by
region, farm type, resource base, productivity, and the goals of their owners.
Some farmers may well face sufficient credit constraints (for liquidity or for
capital) so that receipt of decoupled payments allows them to continue or
expand production.  However, empirical studies indicate that any increased
investment enabled under these circumstances would move the sector
toward greater rather than less efficiency.  In addition, in a capital-rich
economy where few farmers are likely to be capital constrained, any impact
of decoupled payments would be transitory.  Farmers unable to afford effi-
cient levels of investment in productive capital would soon be induced by
competitive forces to relinquish control of their assets to unconstrained farm
owners or managers.49








Economic reasoning and some empirical evidence suggest that farmland
rental payments increase with more direct government payments to farmers
(Barnard et al., 1997; Floyd, 1965; Gardner, 1992; Kuchler and Tegene,
1993; Goodwin et al., 2003; Kirwan, 2003; Lence and Mishra, 2003;
Roberts et al., 2003).  The roles of farm operator and farm landowner
diverge on the 60 percent of U.S. cropland that operators rent from owners
(USDA, 2003).26 As a result, the degree to which farmland rents increase
with government payments strongly influences the distribution of payment
benefits between landlords and renters.  By examining the degree to which
land rents increase with increasing payments, we also obtain indirect
evidence on the potential production impacts associated with domestic agri-
cultural programs.  This evidence is useful because a direct empirical
assessment may be difficult or impossible, especially when program
payments are decoupled. Understanding how agricultural payments could
affect production is central to tracing the full range of market effects of agri-
cultural payment programs, including impacts on world commodity prices
as a result of national supply responses. 
Effect of Payments on Land Rents Depends
on Production Distortions
If agricultural land markets are competitive, land rents will vary according
to the profits tenant farmers expect to earn from farming. High-quality agri-
cultural land, capable of producing higher yields or higher value crops, will
command a higher rent per acre.  Similarly, agricultural lands eligible for
government payment programs also will tend to command higher rent per
acre.  How much higher the rent may be depends on the features of govern-
ment programs, including the flexibility granted (whether they may grow
crops, which crops they may grow, the production practices they may use).
Many agricultural payments—called coupled payments—are connected to
the amounts and/or prices of certain crops.  To maximize profits plus
payments, farmers may use land differently than they would without the
payments—for example, by producing greater amounts of more heavily
subsidized crops.  Altering types or quantities of crop production to boost
payments may generate additional costs and so lower net revenues, which
will offset some of the payments farmers receive.  Moreover, if farmers
collectively produce more output in response to payments, commodity
prices will fall.  When market revenues fall as a result of the program, per-
acre rents are expected to rise proportionately less than the per-acre
26This figure is derived from table
74 of the Agricultural Economics and
Land Ownership Survey (2001).50
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payments farmers expect to receive.  If land markets are competitive, the
difference will reflect the amount that profits are reduced by the production
distortion.  In other words, the greater the distortion, the less rents will
increase with increasing payments.
In contrast, lump-sum, or decoupled, agricultural payments are allocated
irrespective of land use, current production, prices, or input use.  In the
absence of market imperfections, these payments provide farmers with no
incentive to manage their operation any differently than they would without
them, and rents will tend to increase dollar for dollar with level of payments
received.  As an example, consider two parcels of land, identical in all
attributes except that the decoupled payments are linked to the second
parcel.  If payments are decoupled, production activities and profits will be
identical on both parcels, and the increase in rent can be expected to equal
the level of payments.  
No farm program appears to be completely without potential effects on
production.  Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments, established in
the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (and called
“direct payments” in the 2002 FSRI Act), are perhaps the least coupled of
all U.S. Government payments to farm operators.  These payments are
based on historical plantings and program participation and place few
restrictions on farmers’ production activities.  The restrictions prohibit new
fruit or vegetable plantings or conversion of payment-receiving land to a
non-agricultural use. Thus, if these restrictions are not binding, these
payments would not be expected to reduce profits.  Accordingly, farmers
would not be expected to discount the value of current payments when
determining rent. Alternatively, if the FAIR Act programs were to induce an
increase in production, which increases costs or lowers commodity prices
and thereby reduces profits, then the increase in rents would be expected to
increase less than the full amount of the payments. 
If the land rental market operates efficiently, the program-induced increase
in profits plus payments will tend to be passed through to the land owner –
either the full face value of payments or a smaller amount.  If efficient land
markets are assumed, the amount by which payments are not passed through
to land owners therefore signals the degree to which payments could be
distorting production activities and profits.  If, however, land rental markets
adjust slowly and/or incompletely, then the value of the payments may not
be passed through to land owners in the first year or two after the program
is implemented.   Thus, one cannot determine to what extent incomplete
pass-through of payments in land rents is attributable to imperfect and/or
slowly adjusting land rental markets rather than production distortions
attributable to the payments themselves.
Evidence on the Links Between Payments
and Land Rents
A first step toward understanding wealth and production effects stemming
from coupled and decoupled payments is to determine how they affect land
rents.  Land rents would be expected to increase more (relative to a context
with no payments) the smaller the production distortion induced by the51
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payments.  Land rents should rise commensurately with payments if payments
have no effect on production and if land markets operate efficiently.
Income or wealth effects, which have often been used to explain possible
production distortions from PFC and Market Loss Assistance (MLA)
payments, depend in part on the share of payments passed on to landlords
via higher rents.  After accounting for rent pass-through, one can then
examine the relationship between payment benefits received and the wealth
of farm households that receive them. The magnitude of changes in wealth
may indicate the potential for the different kinds of production distortions
stemming from market imperfections (described in Chapter 3 on labor,
Chapter 4 on risk, and Chapter 5 on capital).27 Information about who ulti-
mately receives payment benefits may also be interesting in its own right.
Roberts et al. (2003), by analyzing over 60,000 records of the Agricultural
Census, estimated the amount by which total government payments
(excluding conservation programs) increased land rents in both 1992 and
1997, on either side of the watershed 1996 FAIR Act.  The estimates were
based on a statistical comparison of farm-specific per-acre rental costs with
county average rental costs and how much this comparison depended on the
amount of payments received per acre farmed.  Many variables were used to
control for other factors affecting land rents, and statistical techniques
accounted for differences between actual payments received and payments a
farmer could have expected to receive at the beginning of the season, when
rental agreements are typically negotiated.28 For 1992, the study found that
on land rented via cash leases, 21 cents of each dollar in government
payments received (plus or minus 4 cents) was passed through to landlords
via higher rents.  The estimate for the same farms in 1997 was 33 cents per
dollar of government payments (again, plus or minus 4 cents).29
These findings suggest that PFC payments have approximately 50 percent
greater effect on land rents than pre-FAIR coupled payments.  A large share
of the benefits, for both coupled and decoupled payments, seem not to be
passed through to landlords. This is true even in 1997, a year in which
nearly all payments were from the PFC program.30 Because nonoperator
landlords own approximately 60 percent of cropland, they receive an esti-
mated 20 percent of the total payment benefits via higher rent (33 cents of
the 60 percent of program dollars paid to tenant operators).
Of course, 1997 was the first year in which rental contracts were negotiated
after the FAIR Act, and 1992 was the second year after implementation of
the prior farm bill. If cash rents adjust slowly to the new program benefits,
we may be understating the benefits of the PFC payments to landlords –
both relative to the prior program and in absolute terms.  Also, lands
receiving higher per-acre government payments likely differ in many ways
from lands receiving lower per-acre payments, even within counties, and our
analysis may be reflecting these unmeasured differences.  Although great
care was taken to control for confounding factors, some unobservable
factors affecting rents may be correlated with government payments and
cause the estimates to be biased.
27 It makes sense that payment ben-
efits retained by tenants would be rele-
vant when assessing potential wealth
effects.  It could be, however, that
wealth effects on landlords could also
play a role.  Landlords sometimes
make decisions that affect production,
as they often supply equipment, irriga-
tion water, or other inputs to produc-
tion.  In any case, tracing out the flow
of wealth is important for understand-
ing where wealth effects are likely to
be largest.
28 A statistical technique called
“instrumental variables” was used to
account for expectation error.
29 The analysis was based on cash
rent leases only.  In share-contract
leases, the landlord receives a share of
the proceeds from crops grown, where
the share is established at the begin-
ning of the growing season.
30 The year 1997 was unique in that
nearly all government payments
(excluding conservation payments)
emanated from PFC payments.  Of the
approximately $8 billion paid to farm-
ers in direct government payments in
1997, $6.1 billion were PFC payments,
$1.7 billion were toward conservation
(not included in this analysis), and
$257.3 million came from other
sources.  Unfortunately, the census data
do not discern between PFC payments
and other kinds of nonconservation
payments. 52
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Distribution of Payment Benefits
Most payments are tied to current or historical production of certain field
crops.  As a result, large farmers in Midwestern States generally receive
more government payments than other farmers.  Large farmers also rent a
greater share of land from nonoperating landlords, and may pass more
payment benefits on to landlords.  An account of payment pass-through is
therefore needed to understand the relationship between payments and
household wealth.  
Using 1999 ARMS data, Roberts and Key (2003) examined the relationship
between total (coupled, decoupled, and conservation) payments received and
the wealth of farm households.  In 1999, payments totaled $21.1 billion, of
which 23.8 percent were PFC payments, 35 percent MLA payments, and
32.2 percent loan deficiency payments.  Loan deficiency payments have
much stronger ties to production than PFC and MLA payments.  Figure 6-1
shows the relationship between payments and wealth, both with and without
adjustments for payment pass-through via higher rents.  Each point repre-
sents 1 percent of the sample of farms sorted according to household net
worth.  The study adjusted total payments by reducing them (by a factor) for
land rented in by the farm operator from another land owner and increasing
them for land rented out by the operator to another farmer.  The factor used
for all payments was the 1997 estimate of 33 cents per decoupled payment
dollar passed through to landlords.31 With or without the pass-through
adjustments, wealthy farmers receive far more payment benefits than less
wealthy farmers.
Table 6-1 presents data on government payments (coupled and decoupled)
to farm households in 1999, adjusted to take into account their tenancy
arrangements.  More than 58 percent of farm households received no
government payments in 1999, mainly because they did not produce
program crops and did not participate in other programs.  In contrast, 1.2
percent of farm households received slightly more than 25 percent of total
adjusted government payments, and about 0.2 percent of farm households
received almost 9 percent of all adjusted payments.  Households in the
highest payment category (more than $150,000 of adjusted government
payments) averaged more than $2.1 million in net worth and $236,663 in
(coupled and decoupled) government payments.  Across all farm house-
holds, adjusted total government payments in 1999 were $5,860, about 1
percent of average net worth.  Across PFC recipients, adjusted (coupled and
decoupled) government payments in 1999 averaged $20,381, compared to
an average net worth of $562,567.  In 1999, PFCs accounted for 24 percent
of total payments to producers.
By these tenancy-adjusted measures of well-being, a large share of govern-
ment payment benefits went to the wealthiest farmers in 1999.  Although
adjusted total payment levels are substantial for the higher payment cate-
gories, other researchers have shown that wealth transfers on this scale have
a relatively small effect on labor supply (see chapter 3).
31 Note that payments in 1999 were
substantially higher and of a different
composition than in 1997 so it is not
clear whether the pass-through rate
affected payments by the same factors
as in 1997. The calculations also
assume the factor is the same for share
leases as it is for cash-rent leases.53
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Table 6-1—Coupled and decoupled payments to farm households, adjusted for land tenancy characteristics
Adjusted government              Average unadjusted             Average                Share of farm        Share of all            Average farm
payments                                   government                    adjusted                  households          government           household net
category    payments                     government                                           payments                   worth
payments 
$ per household Percent $
00 0 5 8.1 0.00 507,263
$1 - 10,000 3,3733 ,019 27.4 14.1 514,431
$10,000 - 25,000 19,312 16,476 7.8 21.9 719,726
$25,000 - 50,000 42,020 34,978 4.1 24.3 992,557
$50,000 - 75,000 76,234 60,494 1.4 14.2 1,210,949
$75,000 - 150,000 126,331 100,643 1.0 16.6 1,461,119
> $150,000 278,817 236,663 0.2 8.9 2,146,703
All farm households 6,966 5,860 100.0 100.0 562,657
All PFC participants 24,882 20,381 22.0 64.2 660,031
Source: Roberts and Key (2002). Data are from 1999 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey. All averages are weighted to account
for sample design. Payments are adjusted for payment pass-through on operators’ rented-out and rented-in acreage. See Roberts and Key for
details on how payments were adjusted for land tenancy arrangements.
Figure 6-1 
The Relationship between Government Payments and Household
Net Worth, 1999
Note: Blue indicates payments received and red indicates adjusted payments, which 
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Source: Roberts and key (2002).54
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Conclusions
Recent evidence suggests that government payments to farmers do induce
higher land rents.  The estimated effect is much larger for PFC payments
than for pre-1996 payments, which had stronger ties to current production.
Although cash rents vary a great deal across farmland, the rents seem not to
vary dollar for dollar with PFC payments: only an estimated 33 cents of
each decoupled payment dollar is reflected in higher cash rents.  Many fac-
tors may contribute to this observation.  Some rural land rental markets may
not be competitive.  It may take time for land owners to adjust rental agree-
ments to changing government payment terms and levels, and they may not
seek to extract all farming benefits from these tenants due to familial or per-
sonal relationships.   It may be that production is affected by PFC payments
via the wealth effect in combination with one of more of the market imper-
fections described in Chapter 1, by the remaining land restrictions, or per-
haps via other channels not yet explored. Finally, it could be that these esti-
mates are biased by variables not included in our model. At present, the
finding that renters pass through only a third of a lump sum payment
received may be viewed as puzzling.
The finding that wealthy farmers receive a large share of payment
benefits—coupled and decoupled—is less ambiguous.  This relationship is
robust to different assumptions about the effect of payments on land rents
and provides some insight into the distribution of payment benefits.
Wealthy farm households receive sizable payments and produce most farm
output.55
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